Coll 15/1 'Egypt Affairs: General Situation 1931; Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 1936' [‎28r] (56/493)

35
tohich the difference separating the parties
would be honestly declared in the hope that
it could be composed later, since the ques
tion at issue cannot become a live one for
at least some years. I offered in addition,
if any of these proposals were adopted,
m^lf to make a public statement to
re«ure Egypt as regards the aims of
British policy in the Sudan. I have offered
every guarantee for the safeguard of
Egyptian interests in the Sudan—for
no one realises more clearly than His
Majesty’s Government how vital, for
instance, is Egyptian interest in the waters
of thfe Nile. I have offered to sign the
treaty of mutual assistance and the evacua^
tion protocol—and thus realise one of
Egypt’s most eager aspirations—and to
discuss the Sudan question de novo at a
conference with ohrselves and the Sudan
ese. To all -these proposals I have received
either ah uncompromising negative or
proposals which would involve my re
entering negotiatioris committed to the
thesis that the right of the Sudanese to
self-determination must be subject to per
manent union between Egypt and the
Sudan. I have even found myself accused
of pursuing a policy of endeavouring to
filch the Sudan from Egypt.
My hope is that broader and less stubborn
counsels may come to prevail in Cairo, for
it is evident that the interests of both
countries call for a fresh treaty and would
justify 7 a further effort to reach agreement
so as to enable the two countries to co
operate for their mutual interest and
defence. It is unfortunate that in the
negotiations His Majesty’s Government
have had to deal with a minority Govern
ment, I stated to this House that the
question of the Government was a matter
for the Egyptians themselves. If, however,
we can deal with a more fully representa
tive Egyptian Government and if our
negotiations can thereby avoid being the
subject of Egyptian party conflicts, there
will be a much better chance of carrying
them through to a successful conclusion in
the right spirit. Meanwhile the Treaty ot
1936 will be adhered to.
Egyptian Prime Minister to London for
the purpose of personally contacting Mr.
Bevin. The final breaking oh of these
negotiations may be attributed only to the
inability of Egypt to obtain satisfaction
on the following two essential points, which
are claimed by the Egyptian people.
1. Evacuation of British troops from
Egypt. This evacuation must be imme
diate, complete, and not conditioned by a
treaty.
2. Maintenance of the unity of Egypt
and the Sudan, self-government for the
Sudanese and restoration to Egypt of her
rights in the administration in the Sudan
in order to further the preparation of the
Sudanese for self-government. The unity
of Egypt and Sudan is the will of both
Egyptians and Sudanese, whereas the
British policy is directed towards inciting
the Sudanese to secede from Egypt. As
for self-government, had Egypt not been
forcibly deprived of her rights in the
administration of the Sudan, the prepara
tion of the Sudanese for self-government
would not be so delayed. Egypt is in a
better position and is more anxious than
Great Britain to prepare for self-govern
ment a people of the same race, the same
language, same religion and dependent for
their very existence on the Nile. Egypt
wants the Sudanese to be able as soon as
possible to express their views freely, which
can be accomplished only when British
troops have evacuated the Sudan. The two
preceding points are fair application of the
principles of the Elnited Nations Charter.
For that reason, after exceptionally pro
longed negotiations, the Egyptian Govern
ment, regretfully convinced that direct
discussions held no hope of success, decided
to appeal to the Security Council. This
decision has received the enthusiastic
endorsement of the entire Egyptian people.
Egypt has abiding faith in United
Nations and is absolutely confident that
justice will be accorded to a small nation
which has always firmly upheld the
principles of the supremacy of inter
national law.
Annex 10
lokrasU Pasha’s Statement the Press
on 3rd March
The negotiations between Egypt and
nd Britain began in April 1946 and lasted
5 n months during which the Egyptian
ide earnestly tried in every way to come
o an agreement. This was clearly demon-
bra ted by the journey undertaken by the
Annex 11
Mr. Attlee's Statement in the House of
Commons on \lth March
The statement issued by the Egyptian
Prime Minister on the Anglo-Egyptian
negotiations stated that the final breaking
off 0 of these negotiations might be attri
buted only to the inability of Egypt to
obtain satisfaction on the following two