Coll 6/93(2) 'SYRIA: Situation in – after capitulation of France, 1940. Incl. Proclamation of Independence.' [‎269v] (538/626)

mOJTE.
Please see the Government of India’s'telegram No.3960 below
the draft.
Prom enquiries at the Cabinet Offices it appears that the
Ivl.E.I.C. summaries which have so disturbed the Government of India
have not yet reached this country. They can> of course be sent J
from Cairo to India more quickly than to England. Possibly they
are the same as the "disquieting reports" which have prompted
Sir k. Cornwallis* telegram No.832 of July 28Ji.
JUy taoe Kouy
AlctuKi/ <x r<i c
On the other hand, though the information in triese papers is
doubtless very incomplete, they contain a number of indications of
Moslem anxiety that the promise of independence given to Syria at
the beginning of the campaign will be implemented only after
considerable delay, or not at all; and of suspicions in various^
quarters as to Free French intentions regarding - this promise. ^The
declaration made by General Catroux on benalf of General de Gaulle
when the British and Free French Forces marched into byria is
flagged. Paragraph 4, which is, of course^ the crux of the matter
contains^ an important ambiguity, ^fter declaring that the people
of Syria would be "from henceforward sovereign and independent", it
goes on to define their relations with tne Free French as one of
"close unity in pursuit of a common ideal and aims" pending
negotiation of a treaty "as soon as possible".
General de Gaulle refused to allow this declaration to include
a statement that H.H.G. supported and associated themselves with
this promise of independence, since he felt that this would imply
that the declaration could not stand without British support and
that the word of Free France could not be trusted. In the end a
separate declaration (flagged) containing a statement in the above
sense was made on behalf of H.M.G. by h.m.. Ambassador at Cairo, and
copies of the two declarations, pinned togetner, were distributed
by aircraft.
General de Gaulle made it clear that he did not think that a
British declaration was necessary, or that it implied that H.M.G.
would have any responsibility solving difficulties whicn might
arise between Free France and the people of Syria. He added that,
"It is our understanding that any political settlement in Syria and
Lebanon is the concern of the representatives of France jointly with
representatives of inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon", (Cairo telegram
No.1684 of June 4th).
Mr. Eden’s telegram of July 3rd to Mr. Lyttelton is the fullest
and most reliable evidence among these papers that General de Gaulle
considers that the powers of the Free French in relation to Syria
are the same as those previously held by the Vichy administration;
that he is bent upon excluding the British as far as possible from all
say in the administration of the country or the determiniuC&\of its
future; and that in his view the fulfilment of the pledge of
independence can wait until the end of the war. More recent and even
more disturbing, though perhaps less reliable, indications of the
French attitude towards the British are given in Jedda telegram
No.252 of August 1st; wnile Cairo telegram No.2126 of July 5th and
paragraph 7 of part 3 of Genera.1 Spears * telegram of July 8th report
the existence in the minds of Genera.1 de Gaulle and his entourage of
jealousy of the British and suspicions of their intentions
towards Syria.
Meanwhile both Ling I bn Saud and the Iraqi Government are
givin 0 abundant proof of their anxiety to see the promise of
independence fulfilled; and in doing - so they have made it clear that
in their view the responsibility rests with H.M.G. (This is no
doubt partly due to the fact that Hr Eden's declaration in his
Mansion House speech of H.M.GJs sympathy with ^drab ideals of
federation and independence came shortly before the beginning of
the Syrian campaign). Early in June I bn 3aud enquired "what statement
H.M.G. considered ne night make to the people of Syria and what
H.M.G. intended to grant the people of Syria when they complete the
occupation of the country, and what pledge they intended to give the
Syrians/