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'File 19/172 II (C 94) Bahrain Armed Police' [‎205v] (453/478)

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The record is made up of 1 volume (214 folios). It was created in 13 Feb 1930-22 Dec 1944. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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is extremely amiable, with a constitutional disinclination to take strong measures
on any subject. Even as a judge, his inclination is to- acquit an obvious criminal
and himself to pay a fine imposed. Such a man—except in the fact that he is
younger and has seen changes taking place around him and that he is, in conse
quence, less conservative—is not to be differentiated from his father. Just as Ids
father permitted oppression but did not actively oppress, so would Hamad act.
W ith the exception of Shaikh Kb add, all the old oppressors are still alive and will
ing to resume their former ways if not repressed. Shaikh Hamad would certainly
not repress them if deprived of active British support and direction. To this day
his weakness in any matter connected with the A1 Khalifa is pathetic. In ordinary
matters also, in spite of the presence in Bahrain of a British adviser, he truckles
t° any show of force. In May of this year he reversed a decision he had made the
previous day regarding the amount of advance to divers because a mob of two hun
dred unarmed men made a clamour in his Majlis. It is certainly better that Shaikh
Hamad should govern and make mistakes than that we should govern and make
none, but a man of his type, who will not incur the odium of governing, must have
an adviser. If the European adviser were removed, Shaikh Hamad would surely
fall under the influence of some intriguing Syrian or Egyptian \fho would, for a
consideration, play into the hands of Persia or Najd. It was the defencelessness
of the Bahrain Government in the face of gang robberies which led to the insti
tution of the Indian armed police. These police had to be foreign as the Bahrain
Arab was averse from wearing uniform, had an objection to an occupation un
connected with boats and disliked binding himself to fixed periods of duty. The
armed police are still necessary, but it may be possible to make them less ob-
strusively foreign by substituting Sudanese for Indians, directly the contract of
the latter expires at the beginning of 1931. Owing to the large number of blacks,
descended from slaves domiciled in the islands, the Sudanese would melt into the
landscape in a way the Indians fail to do. Mr. Belgrave, the present Adviser to
Shaikh Hamad, has experience of Sudanese, having served with them in Egypt
during the war. I would have recommended that the present European Comman
dant of Police—whose four-year contract expires about the same time—should
depart with the Indian policemen at the end of 1930. In view, however, of the pro
bability that Bahrain may shortly have to submit to an influx of American and other
foreign drillers and oil workers, I do not think it advisable to dispense with the
services of a European Commandant of Police unless and until we are satisfied that
the threatened invasion—which would certainly include a number of tou^h
characters—will not take place. On the analogy of the Anglo-Persian Oil Com-
pairy, the Gulf Syndicate would probably start a Security Service of its own, and
the Bahrain State will require a European Commandant of Police to deal with it,
and with the bad characters attracted by the chance of employment.
5. I turn now to the Customs Department. This was an old bone of conten
tion between Shaikh Isa and the Government of India. It was Colonel Mead who
first suggested bringing it under control, under the mistaken assumption that
Shaikh Isa was really as poor as he pretended when the presence suited him. In
any case the question of the Customs Department came for a time to be looked
upon as a trial of strength between Shaikh Isa and the Government of India.
The old system was to farm out the customs to a Hindu contractor and, as
was only to be expected, the revenue accruing to the State was much less than it
should have been. This loss was estimated at one lakh One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees of rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. a year, but
judging from the yield of the Customs since it has been put under conscientious
European control, it must have been considerably more.
Customs is the main source of revenue to the State and brought in during the
past year Rs. 11,24,679 out of a total of Rs. 12,15,694.
The Director of Customs is not only in charge of the department from which
he takes his name, but he is also Port Officer and controls the Passports, Regis
tration of Boats, and various minor revenue departments.
Owing to the lack of natives with sufficient education and honesty to take
charge of the various departments, a foreigner must be appointed to control them.
At present the head is a European. Is anything to be gained by substituting an
Egyptian, Syrian or Iraqian ?

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Content

This file contains correspondence regarding the development of the armed police force in Bahrain between the years 1930 and 1944.

The documents discuss the British authorities' desire to reduce the number of Indians employed in the police force and make it appear less noticeably 'foreign'. Various other reforms and training initiatives during this period are also discussed.

A full, detailed report from 1940 entitled 'A Report on the Bahrain Police with Suggestions for their improvement' is contained on ff. 70-167a.

The file also contains detailed instructions regarding protocol for the use of force by the police against crowds (notably the use of firearms against illegal assemblies) and documents containing a broader discussion of the nature of Britain's role in Bahrain.

Extent and format
1 volume (214 folios)
Arrangement

File is arranged in chronological order, from earliest at beginning of the file to most recent at end.

Physical characteristics

Previously a bound correspondence file, its sheets have been unbound and are now loose. A foliation system of circled pencil in top right-hand corner of each front-facing page begins on the title page and ends on the last page of text. There is another inconsistent foliation system that is also in pencil in the top right-hand corner of each front-facing page but is not circled.

Written in
English in Latin script
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'File 19/172 II (C 94) Bahrain Armed Police' [‎205v] (453/478), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/348, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100043949304.0x000036> [accessed 29 March 2024]

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