Skip to item: of 478
Information about this record Back to top
Open in Universal viewer
Open in Mirador IIIF viewer

'File 19/172 II (C 94) Bahrain Armed Police' [‎208v] (459/478)

This item is part of

The record is made up of 1 volume (214 folios). It was created in 13 Feb 1930-22 Dec 1944. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

Transcription

This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.

Apply page layout

12
dency of Shaikh Abdulla, with Shaikh Mubarak marked to succeed eventually to the
Adviser's place.
15. 1 wish to emphasise that even at present there is considerably more Arab
control of the Bahrain administration than would appear at first sight. In conse-
quence, the present administration is popular in the islands. I agree, how r ever,
that the British are too much in the high-lights, and that the signs of British influ
ence appear too clearly in the Indian police force trained like an Indian infantry
regiment though their uniform has been modified. I recommend that this high
light be modified by substituting Sudanese, an Arab speaking force, which blends
better with the population. I recommend further that, unless a European is re
quired to deal with an influx of Europeans and Americans attracted by the Gulf Oil
C ompany, the services of the European Commandant of Police be dispensed with
at the termination of his present contract, but that the services of the Adviser and
the Director of Customs be retained until suitable Arab substitutes have been trained
to take their place.
16. Shaikh Hamad has already extended the term of the Adviser’s contract
till March 1934. It will probably be necessary to grant him at least two further
quaternary extensions.
It is difficult to say when a substitute will be ready to replace Mr. de Grenier ;
but the period required for training cannot be less than seven years from now.
17. As the coming of an oil company is still problematical, I have not dis
cussed this matter at length. If the company should materialise it will of itself
westernise the islands in possibly an unfortunate way, and I presume there would
have to be a British element in the administration to counteract its effects.
18. It appears from paragraph 2 of your letter under reply that Government is
perturbed at the danger that with the example of Bahrain before their eyes, the
minds of the smaller Arab rulers may be turned increasingly in the direction of Bin
Saud. It is tiue that the Shaikhs of the Irucial Coast are extremely jealous of anv
British encroachment on their independence just as Shaikh Isa was before
Lis foiced leh quishment of power. Ihey oppose any concession to the European.
I do not, however, ascribe this attitude w holly to the events in Bahrain. It is due far
more to the natural exclusiveness of the Arab. A certain section of Arab thought
would exclude the foot of the infidel throughout the holy land of Arabia, from Aden
as well as from Mecca.
No attempt had been made to westernise Bahrain when the “ Hyacinth ”
episode of 1911 occurred. It is irom this incident and the comparative immunity
from evil consequences enjoyed by the people of Dubai that I date the increasingly
independent attitude of the Trucial Shaikhs. Sir Percy Cox stated at the time that
the incident furnished a convenient peg on which the Shaikh of Dubai could hang his
objections to the admission of Europeans to the coast. His statement was true in
1911 and is true to this day ; but the British policy in Bahrain obviously cannot be
blamed for this. ‘ ' ^
If w T e interfere in Bahrain to put down misrule, depose its Shaikh, introduce
reforms and then permit the country to sink back into the slough from which we
have rescued it, then indeed will we have forfeited Arab respect and cleared the w^ay
for Bin Saud. In 1920 Major Dickson reported “ our position in the island is found
ed on fear and not respect.’ Now it is founded on respect. The Trucial Chiefs now
see that our intervention has benefited Bahrain and even its Chiefs. We cannot
expect them immediately to call in British advisers on their own account, but in
time their aversion from contact with the European may be overcome through the
influence of a civilised Bahrain. It will not be overcome through a reversion of
Bahrain to the conditions of 1920.
If it suits Bin Saud he will intrigue in Oman as his fathers did before him.
The attitude of the Shaikhs of the Coast will be guided by self-interest as it has
e\ er been. If w e have consistently and with success espoused their cause against
I ersia and >sa]d they will look to us for support. It we have shown no great
energy in supporting their case against third parties, they will be discouraged
and more easily succumb to Najd intrigue. If Bin Saud emerges victorious from

About this item

Content

This file contains correspondence regarding the development of the armed police force in Bahrain between the years 1930 and 1944.

The documents discuss the British authorities' desire to reduce the number of Indians employed in the police force and make it appear less noticeably 'foreign'. Various other reforms and training initiatives during this period are also discussed.

A full, detailed report from 1940 entitled 'A Report on the Bahrain Police with Suggestions for their improvement' is contained on ff. 70-167a.

The file also contains detailed instructions regarding protocol for the use of force by the police against crowds (notably the use of firearms against illegal assemblies) and documents containing a broader discussion of the nature of Britain's role in Bahrain.

Extent and format
1 volume (214 folios)
Arrangement

File is arranged in chronological order, from earliest at beginning of the file to most recent at end.

Physical characteristics

Previously a bound correspondence file, its sheets have been unbound and are now loose. A foliation system of circled pencil in top right-hand corner of each front-facing page begins on the title page and ends on the last page of text. There is another inconsistent foliation system that is also in pencil in the top right-hand corner of each front-facing page but is not circled.

Written in
English in Latin script
View the complete information for this record

Use and share this item

Share this item
Cite this item in your research

'File 19/172 II (C 94) Bahrain Armed Police' [‎208v] (459/478), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/348, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100043949304.0x00003c> [accessed 29 March 2024]

Link to this item
Embed this item

Copy and paste the code below into your web page where you would like to embed the image.

<meta charset="utf-8"><a href="https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100043949304.0x00003c">'File 19/172 II (C 94) Bahrain Armed Police' [&lrm;208v] (459/478)</a>
<a href="https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100043949304.0x00003c">
	<img src="https://iiif.qdl.qa/iiif/images/81055/vdc_100000000193.0x000141/IOR_R_15_1_348_0459.jp2/full/!280,240/0/default.jpg" alt="" />
</a>
IIIF details

This record has a IIIF manifest available as follows. If you have a compatible viewer you can drag the icon to load it.https://www.qdl.qa/en/iiif/81055/vdc_100000000193.0x000141/manifestOpen in Universal viewerOpen in Mirador viewerMore options for embedding images

Use and reuse
Download this image