Coll 17/15(3) 'Relations with Persia: Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration' [‎13r] (25/74)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 3913/127/34]
' July 4, 1938.
Section 1.
Copy No.
Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received July 4.)
(No. 274.)
My Lord, Bagdad, June 22, 1938.
I HAVE the honour to report that on the 21st June, during the course
of my weekly interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Excellency
spoke to me about the news which he had recently been receiving from Iran.
2. He mentioned first the rearming of the Persian army, and told me that
he had reliable information that the Persians had purchased from Czechoslovakia
fifty batteries of field and fifty batteries of mountain guns (he did not know how
many guns there were to each battery). This information has caused some alarm
to the Iraqi General Staff and had increased their desire to strengthen their
own artillery without delay.
3. He went on to say that he had received a number of reports from the Iraqi
consul at Tabriz which indicated that relations between Iran and Soviet Russia
were becoming strained. According to these reports the trouble had started <
about a deal in cattle. In fulfilment \of their trade agreements, the Persians
had gathered for delivery to the Soviel Government large herds of cattle at some
point close to the Azerbaijan frontier. There had, however, been some hitch in
settling the details of the transaction and the Persians had delayed the handing
over of the herds. Thereupon Soviet troops had actually crossed the frontier
and carried off the cattle from Persian territory.
4. After this incident the Persian troops in Azerbaijan had been reinforced
and two divisions, the second and the fourth, with a total strength of over 5,000
men, were now concentrated in the province.
5. Taufiq Suwaidi went on to explain that, according to his information,
the Soviet Government disliked the Saadabad Pact and were bringing considerable
pressure to bear on the Persian Government to withdraw from it. He had further
evidence of the serious attention which the Persian Government were giving
to the possibility of trouble with the Soviet Government. Quite recently a party
of Persian staff officers, accompanied by a French general, had carried out an
extensive tour of the north-western provinces of Iran with the intention of
preparing a defence plan against a Russian invasion.
6. He had questioned the Persian Minister in Bagdad on this subject, but
the Minister had been evasive and was probably not well informed about the
situation.
7. I said that I had no information to confirm these reports of the Iraqi
consul in Tabriz, but prima facie it seemed to me improbable that the Soviet
Government would wish to become entangled in difficulties with Iran as they
were bound to devote their attention to the complex situation in Central Europe
and in the Far East.
8. I then asked how the Minister now found the relations of his own Govern
ment with the Persian Government. He said that, during the last few weeks,
they had outwardly improved, but that feelings of real confidence and sympathy
had not yet been established. He thought, however, that the Shah had recently
given orders that care should be taken to avoid difficulties developing between
the two countries.
9. He concluded by telling me that the Iraqi Minister at Tehran would be
coming to Iraq soon on leave prior to retiring. A successor would be appointed
in the autumn who would also be accredited to Kabul.
10. The Persian Prime Minister is stopping for a day or two in Bagdad
on his way back from Egypt, arriving on the 26th June.
11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires
at Tehran.
[364 d—1]
I have, &e.
MAURICE PETERSON.