File 3360/1916 Pt 1 'Persian correspondence (1916-17)' [‎195v] (395/804)

leave their own districts. In any case it is difficult to get Persians to serve
far from their homes for long. I hope later we may he able to improve
I a°Tee with you that the Levies now at Sirjan are probably not worth
their pay. On the other hand I would not advise their being all dismisse
at once. Every man in our service however half-hearted is a. man lost to me
o^her side and if we cast them all they may become active against us. Cer
tainly enlist the best into the South Persia Rifles if you can get them to 30 m
You might with advantage send them in here. The rest you should get rid of
gradually. Y'ou could turn away at onpe those who absolutely failed when
called upon and others by degrees. I think it would be well to try and keep
some sort of hold over them in case Hussain Khan and the prisoners come back
in this direction and get them over to their service.
I would any Officer coming in to report on the Sirjan-Kerman road with
a view to its being fit for motor traffic. I would also like to know something
of the road Baft-Sirjan in the same connection. We are expecting cars here
shortly from the Sistan side.
(H)
Keport No. 18, dated the 30th September 1916.
Prom— Captain L. C. Wagstaef, Saidabad,
To—The Officer Commanding, Kerman.
1 I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your demi-official, dated
the 19th September 1916, and No. 275 of 23rd September, with enclosures, but
no further communications have since been received.
2 . On the evening of the 27th instant I received information from the
Kalanter of Doragah that Hussain Khan and party had arrived at Kaleh
Ghairbi, and as this was on the road to Horagah, and agreed with information
received by me which pointed to his leaving Kuhistan for that direction. I
issued orders for the Column to move thither at daybreak 28th instant as
there seemed a very good chance of capturing the whole of our enemy s
party.
3. At 2 a.m. night 27th-28th September I received a report that Hussain
Khan was nearing Saidabad. I did not believe it, but sent out a strong patrol
under British officers to find out what they could. Other information came
in which proved he had actually entered Saidabad during the night. Mean
while I had moved out all my force from the gardens we occupy, except a
guard for the prisoners, and surrounded the town, the Infantry holding _ the
north and west sides, and the mounted men the open east and south sides.
The Infantry advanced to the attack and reached by midday the positions
shown in the attached sketch. Practically all the towers_ and walls of the
city were held against us, and there must have been £00 rifles firing on us.
The towers of the Adl-es-Sultan and Rashid-es-Sultan were not occupied by
the enemy. Our guns fired on the towers held by the enemy, but did not
have any great effect owing to their small size, and not being very well
served. Captain Merrill’s brass gun has no sights and only a few shells
exploded. I did not feel justified in incurring the certain loss of life in
rushing the town in day light, and waited for night though I got the mountain
gun to within 250 yards of the town at sunset, and used its last 6 rounds at
point blank range.
Just after sunset about 20 horsemen made a dash out of the town, and
chaching our cavalry out of the way, got clear away, although we fired very
rapid infantry fire at them. During the night we moved nearer the walls,
within 149 yards of them, to be within range for our rifle grenades and
meaning to rush in at dawn. But when we went forward we found the town
undefended. We now occupy most of the towers held by the enemy.
4. It is my belief that Hussain Khan with only some 20 or 30 horsemen
was let into the town and given towers and help by the townspeople. With
out their help he could not have taken a single tower. No one except these
20 horsemen escaped from the town during the night 28th-29th. The presen
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