File 3360/1916 Pt 1 'Persian correspondence (1916-17)' [‎218v] (441/804)

The attack on Maude would be favoured by climatic conditions if under
taken during the cold weather, while the movement through Persia would
preferably be an operation for the hot weather.
On the success or failure of the plans as above outlined depends the deve
lopment of the Shiraz situation. The enemy plans in Persia are impeded so
long as our present position on the Tigris is maintained • their move eastward is
checked ; and the arrival in South Persia of organized enemy forces is rendered
improbable.
It would appear that the features of the present situation at Shiraz are—
The attack on Kazerun was primarily directed against the Persian
Oovernor Parman Parma who is known to be friendly to us.
The tribal forces engaged were robber bands instigated by the German
Agent Wassmuss and unchecked by the Soulet, but caravans and individuals
are apparently permitted by them to move up and down the Bushire-Shiraz
road on the payment of toll.
As for the best method of dealing with the situation we consider it
advisable:—
Firstly .—The South Persian Bifles to be raised and organised efficiently
on the same lines as units of the Indian Army. The control and maintenance
of this force to be placed under the Commander-in-Chief in India. The latter
would nominate an experiened General Officer to exercise command and to
be the supreme British authority up to the borders of Baluchistan, under
Pield Service Regulations, Part 2, chapter 111, section S.
Subject to the instructions given him by the Government of India his
authority must be supreme in all matters.
His instructions will be issued by the Government of India under the
orders of the Home Government, and after reference has been made to the
Minister, Tehran, w r hen necessary so that the latter would thus have an
opportunity to guide the policy to be followed.
This officer must have freedom to act according to the needs of the
situation—in judging which he would have the advice of his local political
officers.
In matters beyond their competence the advice of the Minister at
Tehran would be taken.
The Government of India would give him instructions in regard to the
general military policy governing the mission, strength and object of his force
from time to time. These instructions will be framed by the Government of
India, according to the general policy of His Majesty's Government and after
the advice of the Minister, Tehran, has been taken.
Secondly .—Trade on the Bushire-Shiraz road to be encouraged, and for
this purpose the rebellious Khans outside Bushire should be permitted to
quietly re-establish relations with us without promise being made them of any
thing in the future.
This policy has been previously proposed by us, but it has not found favour
at Tehran hitherto.
In view of the foregoing as to your particular question we advise :—
(i) Against the occupation of the plains country between Daliki and
Bushire as it might result in complications with the hill tribes
and render necessary an advance into the hills, i.e., a further
commitment, if it is to affect the situation at Shiraz ; also the
climatic conditions would be very severe for the troops after
April.
(ii) There is no need for reinforcement Lingah or Bunder Abbas.
Steps are in train to send an escort with staff and instructors to
Shiraz via Bunder Abbas which will be available to reinforce
Sir P. Sykes if the situation there should demand it.
(Hi) We estimate that, in addition to the Bushire garrison, two mountain
guns, two battalions, and some mounted troops would meet the
requirements of the limited operations in the plains country
north of Bushire, which is deprecated in («) above.