File 3360/1916 Pt 1 'Persian correspondence (1916-17)' [‎337v] (679/804)

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and pay while they have the opportunity, and also because prevailing circum
stances suggest enlistment to be a wise course. I can find no reason to believe
in their loyalty should we leave the country—nor at present can I see how
we can maintain any corps composed of these tribes unless we are actually
in possession or occupation of the country which they inhabit. Above all we
should certainly not embark on schemes which are unable to survive if
our policy undergoes a change. Such schemes besides being expensive and
putting difficulties in the way of the Government must result in breaking
faith with the tribes and alienating them from us when we leave their
country.
What has already been done cannot now be easily altered, that is to say,
we must continue keeping the men for the present in employ and to give
some return for their pay they are employed in a variety of ways where it is
possible to do so. I previously reported that General Dyer had not entered
into any agreement as to length of service—but he tells me he feels sure that
he promised them service for three years—Shakar Khan on the other hand says
that no such agreement has been made ; he will look up his papers when we
get to Khwash, at any rate if the agreement has been made and we find the
corps is not to be raised I am afraid that the agreement cannot stand. It is
a case in point to show the absolute necessity of going slow. Previous haste
has made matters so confused that the whole question is one which I must
reserve for discussion with the Agent to the Governor-General when I can get
back to Quetta. For the present I only require the pay and the small office
staff I have already asked for.
374
Dated Khwash, the 26th August 1916 (Secret).
From-—The General Officer Commanding, Sistan,
To—The Chief of the General Staff, Simla.
. ^ k ave th 0 honour to forward you my appreciation of the situation, asked
for m your telegram No. 68889, dated 31st July 1916.
When I arrived at Robat on March 3rd, I realized that what I had come
out to prevent happening was really then in the process of happening, merely
letters sent by certain Germans to the Damanis had been sufficient to induce
them to raid our lines of communications, that if vigorous measures were not
immediately taken in this direction the actual presence of Germans in the Sarhad
and m the Bampur district would immediately raise a much larger storm in
Persian Baluchistan.
Considering that the Russians were coming southwards, and that the
Germans had been ousted from Kerman, I considered that the line between
Birjand and Robat was fairly secure against Germans attempting to get through
there, especially in view of the water difficulties in the summer across the Dasht-
i-Lut. On the other hand, though only a few roads are shown on the map con-
nee ting the Narmashir and Bampur districts with the line Nasratabad-Sibi-
Deham Baghi-Robat-Saindak-Mushki Chah, &c., I was informed that there
were hundreds of others where a few men at a time could cross without any
great water difficulties. That no Germans have tried to cross from Afghanistan
into Bampur or Narmashir is, I think, due to the fact that I have created a
belt or friendly territory enclosed in the rectangle Khwash-Mirjawa-Robat-
Gurg Fort (in the Rud-Mahi). Recently various reports have been received
that Germans have appeared in the direction of Chaharburjak on the Helmund
and then turned northwards, which may indicate that they do not like crossing
the zone I speak of.
* never f or a moment of what I am out here for, and I
laboured with the Ismaiizais centred at Galugan, the Rekis, and the Damanis
to se0 ure what I considered by far the most vulnerable area of the line I had to
ue end, not only with a view to preventing Germans from crossing, but also for
securing my lines of communication.