Coll 30/21(2) 'Persian Gulf: Koweit - Blockade by Ibn Saud' [‎266v] (543/1010)

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in consequence of the conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza in London. Mr. Calvert
drew the Saudi Government s attention once more to the importance which His
Majesty’s Government and the Government of India attach to a solution of this
problem and reiterated the willingness of His Majesty’s Government to do all in
their power to ensure that the honourable undertaking offered by the sheikh
should, if accepted, be observed.
6. Of this communication, which was dated the 12th August, no mention
was made when the Saudi Government informed Mr. Calvert in a note dated the
1st September that in view of the increase in smuggling which the Saudi Govern
ment alleged had taken place since the breakdown of the Koweit conference (but
which was denied from Koweiti sources) they intended to enforce an even closer
blockade and virtually to prohibit all movement across the Saudi-Koweiti frontier.
The Saudi Government were, therefore, reminded on the 16th September that a
reply to Mr. Calvert’s previous representations was still outstanding and they
were warned that if they insisted on demanding impossible conditions from
Koweit they would assume the sole responsibility for the present unsatisfactory
situation. Copies of these two notes are enclosed.
7. On the 15th October the Saudi Government addressed to Mr. Calvert a
note in reply to the above-mentioned communications. From the summary
telegraphed by Mr. Calvert, the Saudi Government appear to have asserted that
they had not sought to interfere in the affairs of Koweit and that responsibility
for the present situation and for the loss which had been caused to Saudi Arabia
thereby thus rested with Koweit and (as it would appear from oral explanations
furnished by the Acting Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs) with His Majesty’s
Government. They maintained, moreover, that the demands made by the Saudi
delegation at the Koweit Conference might justifiably have been severer but that
they were none the less reasonable in that they would have entailed loss to Saudi
commerce and represented the utmost sacrifice which could be made. The Saudi
Government expressed regret that such sacrifices should have been characterised
as unreasonable, and their note concluded by asserting that agreement on the
matter would only be possible if Koweit were to give the required guarantee
absolutely to prevent all smuggling.
8. Such arguments are unacceptable to His Majesty’s Government, who can
only regard this note as evidence of an unsatisfactory and indeed obstructive
attitude on the part of the Saudi Government. In particular, insistence on a
literal acceptance of the condition which King Abdul Aziz seeks to attach to
an agreement is manifestly unreasonable. I shall accordingly be glad if you
will draw the serious attention of King Abdul Aziz to the matter at Riyadh.
9. You should begin, as on previous occasions, by reminding the King of
the unremitting efforts which His Majesty’s Government made to improve and
consolidate relations, first between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and then between
Saudi Arabia and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan . These efforts proved successful, and have led
to settlements which have been to the great advantage of all the parties concerned.
His Majesty’s Government are now most earnestly desirous of bringing about a
similar improvement in the case of relations between Saudi Arabia and Koweit.
Aware or the many bonds which have linked those two Arab States in the past,
His Majesty s Government are sincerely anxious to see relations between Saudi
Arabia and Koweit placed once more on a normal and friendly footing. His
Majesty s Government cannot but feel that, with this object achieved, their
iriendship for both parties will nave been most strikingly demonstrated.
10. You should then briefly remind King Abdul Aziz of the recent
conterence and of the subsequent action of His Majesty’s Government and repeat
with as much emphasis as you deem prudent the views of His Majesty’s Govern-
!Yl ; r?f' t ® S ua . r antee demanded of the sheikh by the Saudi delegation, and now
nsisted on in the Saudi Government’s note summarised in paragraph 7 above.
<min nnibin^K ™ 6 ' 1 to t . pomt out H is Majesty, if you think fit, that he stands to
to sHw it bfA on f, n absolute guarantee, since, even if the sheikh were
won d be’bG dnH? ell T y f T U u n0t ’ T, th the utmost goodwill, achieve more than
alternative and f' y tt - 6 honourable undertaking which he has offered as an
K ^ A,i W u 11 HlS M A s Ys Government are prepared to endorse.
or Govtrnmint rnubi h a PP re ® 1 . at ® the fact that the sheikh, like any other ruler
or Government, could but use his utmost endeavours in either event '
Maiestv’s Government 11 K i ng ‘H’ in the considered opinion of His
Majesty s Government, the sheikh’s offer of an honourable undertaking to do so,