Coll 28/44 ‘Persia. Internal. Fars affairs & Shiraz situation’ [‎9r] (17/843)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
PERSIA.
June 20, 1944.
r
J Section 3.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Copy No. 1
-4
E 3597/155/34]
(No. 248.)
Sir,
Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden .—(
Tehran, 10th June, 1944.
’ I HAVE the honour to enclose a copy of an interesting appreciation of the
tribal situation in Ears, prepared by Mr. Gardener just before he left Shiraz to
proceed on leave. I agree generally with Mr. Gardener s appreciation and teel
that particular emphasis should be laid on the following two points, both of
which were mentioned by him :—
(1) That, although the Qashgai tribes may rally behind Nasir in the face of
a common danger, the kalantars of the main tribes have no desire to
be exploited again by the Soulat ed Douleh family and, gi\en a
reasonable hope of fair treatment, they will very easily be persuaded
to deal direct with the Government. Our experience in Bakhtiari
with Morteza Quli Khan, a much more reliable man than Nasir, shows
us what happens nowadays w T hen a tribal chief is put into a position
of paramount authority in a big tribal confederation. Similar
dissensions could be expected in Qashgai between Nasir and his
brothers and other rivals.
(2) That no long-term reliance can be placed on Nasir’s assurances of a desire
to act according to our wishes. We should take advantage of it now,
hut when British troops are withdrawn Nasir will probably pose as
the national hero who saved Ears from a British occupation.
2. For some time I have been endeavouring to induce the Persian Govern
ment to evolve and implement a definite policy towards the tribes. Such a policy
should include at least the following points :—
(a) Settlement of tribal land cases and the restoration of, or the grant of
compensation for, lands unjustly confiscated by Reza Shah. Under
continual pressure from this embassy some action has been taken, but
several cases are still outstanding, notably the important case of the
Mamassani lands referred to by Mr. Gardener under the heading
“ Methods of Application of British Policy.”
{b) The distribution among the tribes (and among other rural communities)
of the essential consumer goods—tea, sugar and piece-goods—^which
have for a considerable time been available to town-dwellers on coupon
at controlled prices. There have been many scandals in this connexion
and the distribution is, even now, far from efficient; but until recently
rural areas, including the tribes, have had to depend entirely on pur
chases on the open market at exorbitant prices. Lately, with the
appointment of American advisers at a number of provincial head
quarters with instructions from Dr. Millspaugh to expedite the
distribution of consumer goods to rural areas, the situation may have
improved to some extent. I propose to call for reports from consular
officers on this point in order to ascertain whether, in fact, any
improvement in distribution is now taking place.
(c) Settlement of the tribes. This is a long-term policy, and if the settlement
is to be voluntary and not, as in Reza Shah’s time, forced, it must
involve long-term plans and a budget of considerable proportions.
Reza Shah’s settlement was carried out by military force and resulted
in unprecedented mortality among the flocks on which the tribes so
largely depend for a livelihood, and a general lowering of the tribes’
already low standard of living. To bring about the voluntary settle
ment of tribes in villages, the Government must plan and provide
funds for assistance to the tribesmen in building villages, irrigation
works, and the provision of seed, as well as medical aid and the
erection and staffing of schools. It seems unlikely that the Persian