'File 5/14 Continental shelf and marine area' [‎15r] (29/286)

BRITISH EMBASSY,'''
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ref: GS9/-/48
SgPPEl 24th March, 1948.
Dear Department,
Please refer to Foreign Office despatch No.153 (E 1478/276/
91) of the 4th February about the question of exploiting oil lying
under the seabed of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , but outside the territorial
watees of the states bordering on the Gulf.
2. The State Department have spent some time considering the
matter, but a meeting has just been held with members of its Near
Eastern and Petroleum Divisions, at which our Petroleum Attache was
also present. ft this *4ae the State Department officials concern
ed expressed the view that in general the Foreign Office*s line of
approach was very useful and sensible one, and they gave us their
preliminary and informal observations under the following five
headings:
(a) The position of existing coneessions. (Paragraph 7 of the
despatch).
(b) Should seabed add subsoil rights be dealt with together, or
should the latter be tackled in isolation ? (Paragraph 2 of the
despatch)•
(c) The question of the median line and the projection thereto of
land frontiers and that of the probable Persian attitude.
(Paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the despatch).
(d) The assertion of sovereignty. (Paragraph 4 of the despatch).
(e) Fa*** Future procedure (paragraph 5 of the despatch).
3. Their views on (a) are that existing concessions do not
cover after-acquired territory unless this ■ is expressly provided
foijdn the concession.
4. On (b) they consider that there are two ways of dealing with
the point. The first is to hold that only subsoil rights are now
in question, ignoring for the present seabed (and fishing) rights,
and to arrange for any assertion of sovereignty to relate to subsoil
rights only. The second is to assert both subsoil and seabed
rights, but to make any reservations which may be necessary for
acquired seabed rights. They are inclined to prefer the first
alternative as being simpler, with some clause indicating that sub
soil rights should not be exercised to such detriment of seabed
rights as might be caused, for example, feu* by drilling in pearl
beds or by contamination of the waters on fishing banks by oil.
If these problems were in fact to arise, arrangements might be made
ad hoc? for compensation to be paid.
5. They think that the conception of the median line, with the
extension of land frontiers to meet it. is a sound one. Where
there are disputed land frontiers it might be possible to make a
"neutral” zone in the sea areas corresponding to the land areas in
dispute, in which there could be joint rights or no rights at all.
These areas could be allocated whpn a decision is reached on the land
areas concerned. It occurs to us that, if this idea were adopted,
it would be better to have no exploitation at all, rather than joint
rights, since if oil were found in the sea areas, the conflict over
the land frontiers would become even more acute.
6. Their tentative idea about the projection of a land frontier
where the angle at which the frontier intersects the coastline is
in doubt, Is that it might be drawjtfmt to the Median Line perpendic
ular to the general trend of the coast at the point in question.
But it was realised that this might, in practice, be difficult, and
that no decision could be reached unless it could be seen how such a