'File 5/14 Continental shelf and marine area' [‎16r] (31/286)

conception would look on the map. The State Department officials
therefore asked us if you would be good enough to provide us with
a map on which the situation as you see it would be sketched, Much
on the lines of the map which was enclosed in your letter to us
E 9787/716/91 of the 21st November last about the boundaries
between Bahrain and Qatar.
I* ^n the rersian aspect of the problem, their tentative ideas
were rather different to yours. The Iran Section of the State
Department suggested that, in spite of recent excitement over
Bahrain, the question might not really be fundamental importance
to Persia*. They were inclined to believe that more trouble might
be caused by enabling the Persians to say that the states on the
south-western ahore of the Gulf, backed by the United Kingdom and
the United States, had "$wung a fast one on them”, than would be
caused if all the states concerned, Including Persia, were approach
ed at the same time. The Persian Government would certainly make
some fuss, but the Iran Section felt that they might possibley
accept the idea in the end, perhaps with a reservation that their
acceptance must not be taken to prejudice their claims. The other
states, if they accept the scheme need not agree with any Persian
reservations. The State Department officials concerned expressed
the view that the Persian Claim to Bahrain was very weak, but
suggested that it was more likely to be remitted by the Persian
Government to some international authority if the Persians felt
that they had been M bounced”. If this view were accepted, the
question of timing would be of less importance since'Persia would
be informed at the same time as the other states. We pointed out
the difficulties which you foresee - and the additional one that a
Persian refusal, under their proposal, might prejudice the whole
scheme. They emphasised that their views on this point were
personal and were Intended simply for discussion.
8. On the question whether sovereignty over those parts of the
seabed where it was desired to grant concessions should be asserted ^
by the states concerned, the State Department share the views exp
ressed in para 4 of the Foreign Office despatch under reference,
and they think therefore, that this should be done. '
9. On future procedure, the State Department consider that
when the principles and boundaries have been decided between our
two governments, it would be desirable for the United Kingdom
Government to approach the Arab states under their protection, and
for the L.K. Government and the United States Government to approach
the rest jointly, or in concert - i.e. they agree generally with
the views expressed in the first three sentences of para 6 of the
Foreign Office despatch under reference. They added that, from
their point of view, it would be much better to wait until some
solution of thePalestine problem appeared to be in sight, but hoped
tnat this woulli be the ease by the time our two governments are
hre ready to take action.
10. They raised two additional points. The first was that of
secrecy, vjg-g-vtg the oil companies. Some interest in off-share
concessions had been expressed by some United States oil companies
which have, and by some which have not, concessions in the area.
The a&te Department felt that all oil companies shoud have an equal
opportunity of bidding for concessions in hhe areas with which we
are dealing, and hope that you will agree with this. If so, they
suggest that, at the moment when our two governments approach the
states concerned, a press release should be issued about what is
proposed, ee so that everyone would start on an equal footing.
If this were delayed beyond that moment, one or other of the
governments concerned would certainly tell one or other of the oil
companies, and if this were done by the Saudi-Arabian Government
for example, the Arabian American oil Company would start whth an
advantage. The second point on which they would be grateful for
information is whether H.M.G. haver formally adopted, or are likely
to adopt, as a result of these discussions, the principal of the
Continental Shelf for the division of seabed areas in gnneral.