‘File XXVIII/3 Internal Politics and Relations with Oman Correspondence re rebellion of 1895 and subsequent warning to shaikhs against any further attack on Muscat.’ [‎22r] (56/142)

Experience has shown that the Bedouin cannot be restrained for long
from pillage and plunder, and once inside the walls there is almost as much to
fear from friend as foe; the Sultan is unable to control his allies, the rebel
leaders their followers, the chief object of an Arab war being to make off with
as much plunder as each side can secure.
13. Tiie remedy for this unsatisfactory state of affairs would, I submit,
be found in a change of our policy towards the country.
If the present be thought a fitting opportunity for withdrawing from the
Convention of 1862 with France, two courses would be open :—
(a) To annex Muscat and Mutrah and pension the Sultan.
Ibis is such a radical measure that perhaps it need not be seriously
considered in this letter. The result to us would be that we should gain a
naval position which we practically command already, but with this
advantage that we should be able to put it in a proper state of defence, secure
the harbour and anchorage and command the trade of the country; in fact
create a Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. Aden, To the Sultan it would mean the loss of the
Sultanate, for, wdthout the walls and forts of Muscat, he could not rule Oman
for a single day. The country would fall into tw r o divisions—one ruled by
Seyyid Ibrahim bin Kais from Kustak, the other by Sheikh Salih from
Sammed, the intervening tribes falling under the influence of one or other
of these Chiefs.
(A) To declare a British protectorate over Oman.
I trust it may not be considered presumption on my part if I express the
opinion that the time is drawing near when w T e may have to take some step in
this direction or the march of events will force it on us. The advance of
Russia, the interest taken by that Power and by France in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,
where they have no commercial responsibilities, the gradual extension of Turkish
influence over the Arabian peninsular, and the future political conditions of
Persia, are all questions in connection with which our future position in the
Gulf w ill have to be determined. The hold which a protectorate would give
us over Oman and its important harbour and coaling station at Muscat, which
could easily be rendered impregnable, w ould materially strengthen that posi
tion. Any question of the extension of French influence at Soor or of interfer
ence in the politics of Oman wmuld at once be set at rest, and a more effective
barrier would be placed in the way of Turkish designs on the country, w hen
a more general movement of that nation tow ards Arabia takes place.
14. In the country itself I believe that a British protectorate would be
welcomed by the people, botu Minawis and Ghafiris alike, with the exception
perhaps of the maritime tribes of Soor, who still continue to traffic in slaves;
the people are w’ell disposed towards us, they know our power, and w 7 ould be
glad of the rest which a final appeal to an authority whose decision they
would not question would give the country.
On all sides since the rebellion from the Sultan downwards in Muscat
have I beard the same expression of opinion—it behoves the British Govern
ment to look into affairs—which can only be interpreted as a desire to see
closer relations established between us and Oman, whilst there is a va°-ue
feeling abroad that, unless the British Government takes some definite action,
the Sultan will not be able to hold his own, and security wdll not be perma
nently established in Mutrah and Muscat, where our interests chiefly lay.
15. A protectorate need not necessarily imply an unqualified support of
the reigning Sultan against the declared voice of the people, which I may say
it w 7 ould be very difficult to ascertain in view of the rivalry existing between
the Ghafiri and Hinawi factions; but given that with our support the Sultan
ruled moderately w'ell—and his rule has never inclined to undue severity—lm
would look on that support as the certain means of his retaining the Sultanate,
whilst it would effectually check the designs of ambitious Chiefs like Sheikh
Salih bin Ali. We need not interfere in internal affairs more than we may