Ext 5000/41(1) 'Persia: situation leading up to, and after, the Allied occupation' [‎134r] (267/606)

[ lis telegram is of particular secrecy and should be
retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].
[ Cypher].
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ET
WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION .
From: TURKEY.
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FROM ANGORA TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen.
No. 1989 . D.
10th August, 1941. R.
9.02'-p7m,,
4.40 a.m..
4336
1S 4 T
IQth Atfgust, 1941.
16th August, 1941.
Repeated to Moscow No. 192.
Tehran No. 78.
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IMMEDIATE. , , ^ I ^
My telegram No. 1968. ( £ t*tW | 1 ^
My Soviet colleague and I made communications this
morning. He had received instructions to give direct assurance
as well as to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of
memorandum handed to the Iranian (Persian) Government.
2. We each read summary of your memoranda. I think
that my Soviet colleague^ document was a reproduction in
extenso of memorandum handed to the Iranian Government. It
contained a reference to the insistence that 80% of the
Germans should be turned out by the end of the month.
3. We handed copies to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
in the form of aide-memoire and then read and handed direct
assurance in the form of memoranda. These were identic in
terms given in the first para graph of your telegram No. 1781.
4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs first asked why pur
action had been postponed from August 14th to August 16th (see
m y tel egram No. 1968 1st paragraph). He seemed to suspect
that wenad~wai ted till' 2 days after the representations in
Tehran. This having been cleared up he made a remark to the
effect that we had avoided letting him know in advance of the
proposed action. I said on the contrary he and I had
discussed the question more than once, e,g* my telegram No.
1958. He admitted this.
5* He then asked me iflha! any idea as to how the
Iranian Government*would take our representations. I said
that it was impossible to say. but they had already turned
out a few Germans. I suggested that he should urge the
Iranian Government to comply as this was in the interests of
all of us. He said that this would be difficult because the
( Germans had recently informed the Iranian Government that
Turkey might attack Iran (I gathered, in combination with
Germany).
6 . He harped a good deal upon the question whether we
were really taking this action solely on account of Germans
in Iran. We both assured him that this ,was the case. I
reminded him of the consequences of the Fifth Columnin other
countries and we pointed out that they existed even in South
America and no doubt also in Turkey. I also informed him of
? the fourth paragraph of Tehran telegram No. 491. put it was
| pretty evident that he~renains"~suspT:cious that-wc have ulterior
| motives. He asked what we proposed if the Iranian Government
refused