File 3372/1916 Pt 2 'Arabia: French and Italian policy' [‎37r] (82/498)

and criminal powers granted them bv tl>p (toncvoi nm ^
mv recommemlatioi). As a matter of fact ontsi tb 1 CPr - omman ^ ,n g-in-(djief
troubled with civil and co.mnc^ial s^iSpnSe rtffT '? ^ Wn H '
through the good offices of the local Political Oflicer J ' IStment !’- v comprom
on
ttJe
ise
of tin
11). As regards the Civil Medical hrnnr-b ^ i ,
he Civil Medical work from that of the Arinv^ilr 1 '^! lea( ]A/ or the separation
1 raised the question with the Director of Medical rV’^ ’ ail< f )efore 1 j eft
had not now come for creating a Civil Medical DemnV 1Ce ' S . a , s t0 w ^ et ^ ler time
though still to be under his ommral ^vy J^ U ^ f- sp P ara tepersonnel,
A similar separation has recently been effected in the Depaitnei ro! y Ch°irp de ! ^ l 0 '''
m these matters we are so dependent on the milhnrir • U \ 1 osfs ’ ^ ut
*'”■»**'»™ *« • u. „z Sut%srrsjt** l " ve »
"f"?.? '"“f " , “ l +***• on th. porno,, /„ ‘ llidf"””",/™ 1 £
Baghdad and Basrah Vilavets. 1 should Tav tW fl y an ' , v* er m tl,e
internal security only, we should require lb,' some timAafteAthe ^Cr to'keep^'
dnasum m Alesopotarma with one British regiment to a Brigade as at velnt
con ,U le,l, ami about the same number of gendarmerie, exclusive of 1,000 Ail police
foi the ton ns. In the course of tune we should hope to replace the Indian troops bv
Aiabs, oiganised on (he hues of the Egyptian Army, hut it must necessarily 1 take
some vears. I am not of the opinion that any Indian police will he required except
sma 1 leavens to begm with to form a nucleus for the training of the indigenous
pioduct. I hope that in this field we shall be able to give employment A the
Arab ex-officer of the 1 urkish Army, otherwise this class will be a difficult and
malcontent element to deal with. c 111 ana
l’l. The direction* in which ice can most usefully direct our energies with a tiew to
■populinsiug our Administration are Irrigation, Education, and Civil Medical In
all these departments we are alive to the importance of speedy progress and are
doing our utmost compatible with existing conditions and with the material at our
disposal.
\ re most nee d to encourage are: Firstly, -the Jewish com
munity m Haglidad. In this connection I recommend that Dr. Weizman be induced
if possible, to pay a visit or send a reliable representative to Baghdad to influence the
Jewish community in favour of the British connection. Secondly, the Arab notables
and nobility among the townspeople of Baghdad and Basrah. They are a somewhat
impecunious and backward element, but one which it is very necessary to encourage
and take into our counsels as far as possible. Thirdly, the wealthy landlord element,
both Arab and Jew, and the important Shaikhs of the settled tribes. If it becomes a
question of obtaining public expression of feeling in favour of British control, it
can lie done; but 1 think the subject would have to lie handled cautiously. The
intelligent inhabitants of Iraq at the back of their minds are possessed by the
apprehension that Mesopotamia may conceivably he restored to the Turks at the
Peace Conference, and as Jong as this nightmare is present with them we should
merely emphasise it by asking them which Government they would prefer. Bv so
doing we should be clearly putting them in a very unfair position because they know
veil that if they elect for British control and if nevertheless the Turks were
ultimately to return, all those who had declared for us would receive short shrift.
It will be understood that the rural population of Iraq as a whole is quite inarticulate
and can hardly be consulted. As regards the elements who do count, c.g., the Jews
and other denominational communities in the large towns, they could without doubt
be squared in some form to give expression to the sentiments that we desire. But
Ave must consider and decide what is to be regarded as constituting the representative
public opinion which we have to consult.
-T Steps to he taken to consolidate Commercial Influence in Mesopotamia.
The great initial difficulty here is the absence of commercial transport and general
scarcity of tonnage and accommodation, and last, but not least, the uncertainty of the