Coll 17/30(2) 'Proposed additional outlet to the sea in or near Kuwait territory. Development of port at Um Qasr.' [‎10r] (19/289)

COPY
(111/6/44)
BA/75
EMCLO SURE D IN BAGDAD DESPATCH
NO .527 OP 17th NOVEMBER 19 th Novornber, 1044,*
1944.
q(7y
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
PERSIA AND IRAQ COMMAND^
HBM. Embassy
Bagdad.
13th November, 1944
UM Q/i 3 R INSTALLATIONS
^ The future of the British Military Installation at UM QASR has, in
./b past been the subject of correspondence between this GHQ and the
vritish Embassy. No decision has been reached as to its future disposal.
It should be noted, however, that this GHQ has not carried out any
demolitionsor the removal of any stores partly because it was hoped that
there might be some guidance from London as to future policy and partly
because it has been found possible to make use of UM QASR in a very
limited capacity.
2. The situation now is changed and the installation no longer has any
military use. It is actually now a liability owing to the necessity to
guard the stores and because normal depreciation is taking place. As
a result, it is considered that the position should be reviewed and
the GHQ hopes to get a policy decision from the War Office on the
action it is to take in the matter. Before doing so, however, owing
to the political implications, the matter is being referred to you
for any comments you may wish to make
3. The installations at UM QAGR, and most of the railway, signal, and
water lines are understood to lie ,rr ithin the area which forms the subject
of dispute between IRAQ and KUWAIT, In vie’* r of this fact, this GHQ has
refrained from any action as to disposal. If, however, we take no action
until after the dispute is settled, and this appears to be a post-war
problem, we may well find ourselves unable to take any steps about
demolishing the quays, etc., as well as the communications to the port
from SHAI3A, as all personnel capable of such a task will have left.
4. This GHQ is not in a position to say whether the port of UM QASR
would be of value as such in the post-war economy of either IRAQ or
KUWAIT. It seems most probable, however, that the value lies in the
stores such as railway lines, pipe lines, timber, etc., which are likely
to be in world shortage for some years after the war. To dispose of
the port in this manner would, of course, be a considerable financial
loss to the treasury as stores are sold to foreign governments at
vocabulary prices and not at cost price on site. We should thereby
lose the value of the work done as well as incur the cost of dismantling.
5. There is one further complication which was not so apparent at any
period in the past when the future of this port was considered. No
survey has been made of the materials used and it is thought unlikely that
much will be of Lend Lease origin. On the other hand, practically all
the material is similar in type to that now supplied under the Lend
Lease Agreement. As you know, the British Government does not agree to
the USA contention that the latter has any interest in British goods
similar to Lend Lease goods and the matter is still under discussion. It
would naturally be impossible, and undesirable, to attempt to conceal
as large a transaction as the sale of UM QASR as a whole or as stores.
There might well, however, be repercussions with the USA should such a
sale take place unless they were consulted. If this were done, the
USA authorities would certainly insist that full publicity be given
to the fact the British only find themselves in the position of assisting
the IRAQ or KUWAIT governments by virtue of the co-operation of the USA.
6. This GHQ would like to demolish UM QASR now and to take the stores
into stocks in our depots for disposal in the normal manner* by loan-
military use of despatch to other theatres of operations. This can now
be done with the resources available. Our resources are diminishing
daily and unless the natter is taken in hand soon, it will not be
possible. It is intended,therefore, to approach the War Office making
this recommendation. Before doing so I should be grateful for any
comments you may wish to make.
(Signed) ARTHUR SMITH.
Lieutenant-General
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.