Coll 17/30(2) 'Proposed additional outlet to the sea in or near Kuwait territory. Development of port at Um Qasr.' [‎23r] (45/289)

aiJUtftry su./jllea to Iraq could bo built up. The DopartaOQto
chiefly Intoreoted the v»r Office t nd Air ministry.
Cola'll Cpr«g^#tt wos however, Inclined to the view that
o*ln* to the uncertainty of the future *e ou^tt to hold on to
tja asr and said th> t If the tar Office .nd Air hlniatry
decided thr t we ahould retain c ontrol of the port he thought
the Adtlrelty would support »uoh a pulley*
C.v^TAlTf OATX said th t If , «r«la were hostile to ue or
under the Influence of a hostile power, the hatt*al~Arab would
be denied to ua end da ear would be a valuable alternative
su >ly route. f?e Uiou^nt that i-.m we wert? there we ou*ht to
at^y there. The port wee uneultable Xor a naval baee in the
atrict aenoe, even if It could be converted into one. ie
thought t>% prc&cfit it would tedee ahlpa of only about lift draught
at low w.*,ter ^nd of about So-dft at hi^h water. Thie wou^d allow
a largo crulaer to ent*?r the port; but f^lt that we should be
moot unlikely to re uire Uu aer aa oven a teaporary TJavai baae
for there were wore auitable faellltlea available for Kavel
requlv^ aente elaewhere In th^ area.
34R. COUHH waa un ratood to way th&t the trouble off
the port va« not enough avlnging room for snips ae the deep
water wae also nr row.
MK% "P •;:L eaii th t he thought the heikh of Kowelt
would h«ve m objection to our keeping the port oura«lv< a, but
he wae determined not to let the Iraqi# have it am would prefer
ua to destroy the wor^e alreaov eonetruoted rather than h u the
port over to Iraq.
There was aowe diacueaiun whether the port could be
developed without including w*m roweltl territory. ihile
different oplnione were exprcaaed on tbia point, it waa clear
that the port could not be approached without paaaing through
Rowelti water#.
Tit K. '•••’? K OK aaid th t U waa cle^r th t it would be
neoeeaery ea a first step to send a forautl coaaunlCMtloxi to tne
Iraqi ovemfiont oboat th# notification referred to above, which
would safe guard our own pool lion and th^t of the thelkh of Kowcit.
Thia fwte ehoul S be couched in terae which would not require engr
reply# It waa agreed tht the foreign rflce and inula Of lice
should drsft a note on theae llnee*
!UH M. O T T '(>!•< said th t the ae*t queatioh waa what
atepe ahould be taken to resolve tne Koweitl-lfw 1 dlaputc. e
could either augi.eat tr..t the diapute be put to arbitration, or
else evolve aoaw «uHiua v.ivcjidl wiiich would It^ve ua in control.
I^ealdee the rvaaon given above for rt,twining the port in our
own h«nd», it wc** poaGibie that the haara vetrolcua company
night .ie v«lop oilfield* in ’ outhorn Iraq aft^r the war, m that
the port would thu» be uaefdi ae an outlet for thvlr oil.
Civ. T/ TR 0!SX said th^t if Urn aer bac^ae an oil
exporting port tnd therefore an alternative route to hatt-al-
rut in case of necneaity, th«> Admiralty would take a far greater
int*r t\ in it. It* uaefulneaa dc pen led however aa to whether
the source of the oil were in friendly hand# or not.
It waa finally agreed th? t the Uar Office should be
aakeU to produce f*n estiaat# of th< co;it of the port a*
orifinally planned aa a d bertii port of which 1| b» rtua have
bean/