Coll 17/30(2) 'Proposed additional outlet to the sea in or near Kuwait territory. Development of port at Um Qasr.' [‎99v] (198/289)

MIITUi 1 E
It will "be remembered that objection lias been taken to ah.Iraqi G-ovemment
notification (copy at Ext. 5066 / 42 ) levying dues on shipping using the Port
of Um Qasr and its approaches, on the O rouna$ tha.t the Iraqis have no right
to legislate either for the Port itself, which lies in disputed territory, or
for its approachesj part of which ane Koweit territorial waters. It was felt
that a notiiication of this kind should have been issued by the military authorities
who, with the agreement or acquiescence of the Iraqi Government and the Sheikh
of Koweit, are administering the Port area for the duration of the war, *
2. The submission at Ext. 6742/42 dealt with a line of action which had been
agreed at an interdepartmental meeting. In accordance with this. Sir K.
Cornwallis was instructed, in Foreign Office telegrams Nos. 1126 and 112? of
December 10th, to address tsw^note to the Iraqi Government,
(a) asking that paragraph 3 of the notification, which prescribes charges
for the use of the Port, should be cancelled;
(b) putting it on record that the performance by the Basra Port Directorate
of certain speciiied services in the approaches to the Port was without prejudice
to the rights of the Sheikh in Koweit territorial waters.
3. In nis telegram ho. 1262 of December 18th Sir K. Cornwallis has raised various
points with regard to these instructions. We have also received a telegramjf^TU/^fibouC.
No.T/803 of December 23 rd anoAletter frdm the Foreign Office, both commenting
on the Bagdad telegram. The points at issue are as follows:-
«
(i) Sir K. Cornwallis argues that it would be misleading to include in the
draft note a passage to the effect tha.t the Iraqi Government had agreed
to^tne administration of the Port area by the British military authorities
while the war lasts, since in fact they have never gone so far as to give
their written agreement to this. He therefore proposes the alternative
formula in pa^.. 1 of his telegram. It is unsatisfactory that there
snould be .my^written record of the Iraqi Government*s agreement, but in
the circumstances the amendment proposed seems as good as any that could
be devised. Both the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. and the Foreign Office are prepared
to acquiesce in it.
Having proposed this amendment, however. Sir K. Cornwallis proceeds to
recconend the cancellation of the entire paragraph to which it relates.
His rea.son for this is that the Prime Minister had asked him ’’not to put
any tiling official on paper** about the Portland he would therefore prefer
to try and secure the cancellaation of paragraph 3 by means of unofficial
representations. As the Foreign Office point out, it is not easy to
see from paragraph 2 of his telegram what procedure he has in mind. The
Foreign Office argue that there are two possible courses
(a) to ahead as originally proposed, but with a slight modification
in the written coinmumca.tion. This would involve overruling Sir
K. Cornwallis'objection to a written request for the cancellation
of paragraph 3. We must assume therefore that it would increase the
01 dij. ficulties with the Iraqi Government, and of a
refusal by them to accede to our wishes,
(b) to arrange orally for the cancellation of the whole notification.
The Foreign Office draw attention to the danger of keeping our
negotiations with the Iraqis entirely on verbal footing, and suggest
that some written communication will be necessary.
In these circumstances the Foreign Office propose that, before taking a final decision
on this question of procedure,they should explain the position as they see it fully to
Sir K. Cornwallis and obtain his views. It is suggested that we may agree to this.
At the same time, this Department considers that there is a third possible course of
action, described in paragraph 3 of the draft below, which would not be open to the
disadvantages of the other two, and which may well be what Sir K. Cornwallis envisages.
A telephone conversation with the Foreign Office has revealed that this solution had
not occurred to them and that they are prepared to consider it. It is accordingly
proposed to suggest to them that their telegram to Bagdad should be so drafted as to
indicate this course as a possible alternative to the other two which may well be
preferable to either of them.