File 3516/1914 Pt 7 'German War: Persia' [‎74v] (153/519)

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mtural cause3 As I have already said, the Swedes very soon learnt to think they had
no masters and when they were invited by ourselves to carry out their work m the
no masters, ana wnen n j ^ ]_r; g Ma esty s consular officers m these
southern being exerted in directions 7 not always compatible with
! ou g r interest" Our interests were of course, bound up primarily in the maintenance t;/
orde'^buTit will readily be understood that the Swedes -few of whom know Persian^
havdn" to depend for local knowledge on their Persian officers, were often led to
conclusions and brought into conflict with the policy of His Majesty s consu s. er
Z outbreak of war this divergence of views developed, from causes I have already
endeavoured to describe in the Earlier part of this despato^ mto ^
which while it has been quite perceptible on the part of the Swedes themselves, has
I shown itself most markedly in the conduct of the Persian officers. Several incidents,
and one in particular at Bushire, have shown how widespread is this anti-British feeling
I among the latter and in some cases the Swedes have shown unmistakable inclination
| to attach credence to their native officers’ reports rather than to ours, and even to back
1 UP ‘ There have also been other causes contributory to the unsatisfactory attitude of the
Swedes such as the blame attached to them over the Kazeroun affair and the accusation
published in the British press on official authority of their having connived at the
smu* of arms in German interests. There can be no doubt that, as regards the
first" the Swedish officers’ behaviour was most discreditable, but in the second mcii en
I am quite convinced that a hasty conclusion was formed from imperfectly known facts,
and the Swedes were quite guiltless of the charge. At all events the arms in question
are now in Tehran in the possession of the gendarmerie.
Of late, however, the Swedes have appeared to realise that they have as regards
their relations with the Germans, been extremely indiscreet to say the least ol it and
they are likely to be much more careful in the future to preseiwe themselves even from
an appearance of partiality. Nevertheless it is to be anticipated that the attitude of
S the Swedish officers towards us will continue. It is not likely to > exhibit itself m so
marked a degree or with so unfortunate results as during the war, out even after peace
is concluded I feel convinced that their disposition not to recognise the predominance
of our interests and influence in southern Persia will still continue. The question thus
arises, what is to be our attitude towards these officers.^ I have not, of course forgotten
that His Maiesty s Government and that of Russia decided three months ago that they
must be removed from Persia, hut of late M. de Etter and I have thought it wiser not
to press the question for the reason that, thanks to the anti-Russian attitude ol the
Swedes, they have become very popular with the Majlis and the pro-German elemen s
in Persia, and to have insisted on their withdrawal might have_ embarrassed Ain-ed-
Dowleh’s Cabinet. Moreover, their attitude has been more satisfactory of late, and
they profess themselves to be quite ready to carry out all orders from the Government,
even should these orders involve action against their German friends; indeed, in
one or two instances they have done something to make good those professions. I he
above-mentioned decision of the Governments was arrived at—on our part at all
events in consequence of the pro-German proclivities and activity of the Swedes, and
was precipitated, il my memory is not at fault, by the story ol arms smuggling m
German interests, a story which, as before said,_ I believe to be quite unfounded on lack
In the circumstances, therefore, a change of attitude on our part towards the Swe is
officers would be easily explained. I believe that, with few exceptions, they will m
future be very much more careful to observe a neutral attitude both in word and deed,
and more amenable to the orders of the Persian Government, through whom I think it
should be possible to secure that the Swedes shall not be able to push their unques
tionably anti-British feeling in purely Persian local affairs to any dangerous extent.
The risk of Persia being thrust into a state of war against us is now remote,
Government of whatever complexion would allow Turco-German influence to carry them
so far. and the only possible manner in which such an event could be brought about
would seem to be by some local act of violence of such gravity that we and^ our Allies
could not condone it. The Swedes in their chastened spirit can he counted on not to
precipitate such an incident, but rather to prevent it. It must not be forgotten that
the disappearance of the Swedes will be followed, in a very short interval, by a return
to the deplorable conditions of insecurity on the roads, &c , that obtained three years
ago, if indeed things would not be very much worse ; and I submit that, unless my
iudo-ment as to the probable behaviour of the Swedish officers is entirely at fault, i
would be to our interest, as well as to that of Persia, to retain them in south Persia and
more particularly in Ears until the conclusion of peace, or until it is convenient to us to