File 3516/1914 Pt 7 'German War: Persia' [‎93r] (190/519)

[2449 a—2]
[Thifi Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Govemmentj
THE WAR.
CONFIDENTIAL.
(s’M
Section 2.\
[87732] No. 1.
0
Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey—(Received July 1.)
(No. 86.)
Sir, Tehran, June 10, 1915.
THERE can be little doubt that one of the factors that have enabled the German
propaganda in Persia to gain so strong a hold on popular sentiment has been the
attitude of the Swedish gendarmerie officers, and yet I am nearly convinced from the
conversations I have had with some of them that they have been until recently quite
unaware of the responsibility they must bear for the present state of affairs in Persia.
Taking all the circumstances of the case attending the position of the Swedes into
account, it seems to me that this result was almost inevitable. On their arrival they
soon saw, and indeed it must have been impressed upon them, that if their task was to
be successfully carried on they must make their own personality felt, or, in other words,
disregard in a very large measure the orders they might receive from the Persian
authorities, and the result has been the creation of a disciplined force scattered over the
most important trade routes and centres of Persia, practically independent of the
Persian Government, and at the sole orders of the Swedes. They have received the
financial support of ourselves and the Russians, and have learnt to spend lavishly, and
when our subventions failed have on one or two occasions forcibly appropriated Govern
ment funds destined for other purposes. They have thus acquired an immense prestige
in the eyes of the natives. . .
AVhen the war broke out the Swedes had a bond of sympathy with the Persians in
their dislike of Russia, and very naturally expressed their confidence, or at least their
hope that Russia would be defeated by the vast military power ol Germany, and so t e
ground was prepared for the seed of the Turco-German propaganda. Ihe Swedes also
were very industriously cultivated by the German Legation, and when the German
ao-ents who now overrun so large a part of Persia, arrived, what more natural than that
the Swedes should give assistance to their friends’ friends by facilitating their journeys,
providing escorts, &c. Escorts, it must be remembered, are provided m dangerous
districtsliy the gendarmerie to any European who may demand it, and with their wish
to be friendly, the Swedes without doubt have been sometimes, but not, I concede, by
any •means" always,! very useful auxiliaries _to the German agents. In ^
of Prince Reuss XXXI. and M. Logotheti, their good offices converted their
Excellencies journey in a sort of royal P™g ress ’ but m
for them as neutrals to refuse every assistance to foreign diplomats, and Major de
who had travelled all the way from Constantinople with the Austrian and German
reoresentatives, realising that it behoved him not to be too ’
left his companions at Bagdad so as to save appearances. The result was not what he
had intended ; for he was looked upon as a sort of courier sent to make arrangements
for the recention of the German and Austrian representatives—which he undoubtedly
dh Stffl Lre does not seem to be anything in what ^ey dU to whmh senons
exception could be taken, had the circumstances been n ^™Ao ^<^8^ the effect
very vounfr in Persian experience and then lack of capacity to understand the eaect
whfch their intimacy with the Germans and Turks and ^-^"^ISetion
the war would produce on (he native mind has only too otten led them into indisci
° f W0 Was”nutrL been particularly successful in making use of He^s^ery
an expedition of this kind was d 601 ^; P^^TtekeThiTin ^he samelirection.
"which the Swedes represent
their action, and it is a plausible enough deiencm too ^
But I fear that it is beyond question that ® 0 "™r? r ° complacance towards
been actuated by a feeling of pique agams . j d its orioin in quite
their German friends. Again, this feeling seems to me to have had on„in ^ q