File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎47r] (102/834)

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THE PROBLEM OF MEDINA.
Our advance in Palestine has put the Turks in a quandary about
their Hejaz forces which, all told, have a ration strength of about
23,000. These are in danger of being cut off and lost to an army
which wants without delay every trained man it can get. The
peculiar politico-religious value of Medina to the Ottoman Empire
caused all the earlier counsels of prudence to be rejected by the
Higher Command, and these troops, drawn originally from among
the best in Turkey, have been left till the last minute. If they
are to be saved, it is now (he., within the next few weeks) or
never. As things are, the enemy strength on the long L. of C.
is barely adequate to hold it. If it be depleted at all, the L. of C.
must be abandoned. Since, however, the Medina garrison,
according to latest reports, is in such a weakened state that its
fit men are not more than enough to hold the town and outposts,
it cannot reinforce its own L. of C. or replace any considerable
drafts taken from the latter’s guards. In another case, were
military considerations the same, authorities so well informed
and advised as the Turkish would unquestionably order the
whole of these forces to prepare for evacuation, and at the earliest
possible moment to endeavour to get back to a distant base, from
which they could be redistributed to a properly supported front.
But this case is unique, and certain conditions governing policy
in regard to it are peculiar.
Notoriously, the powers that be in Turkey are convinced
that general peace is not far distant. They believe it will be
concluded, at the best, on status quo ante bellum terms ; at the
worst, uti possidetis! On this conviction they are disposed to
gamble. Therefore, seeing the immense importance of still holding
the Medina card in their hand at the Peace Conference, they will
not regard military reasons alone or primarily in regard to the
Hejaz. While, however, they want still to hold on to the place
for some months at the least, at the same time they urgently need
Hejaz troops elsewhere within the next few weeks. Since the
effective strength of the actual Medina garrison leaves even now
little margin of safety, and that of the L. of C. troops no margin
at all, the only possible way of realizing both their desires is to
withdraw fro m Medina only the ineffectives, and from the L. of C.,
if any strength at all is taken, the whole strength.
This means that before very long, if the Turks manage to
keep the Hejaz railway open, the city of Medina may be left to
a garrison of 3,000 to 4,000 men, cut off from all the lest of the
Ottoman forces by an interval of at least 400 miles, and without
possibility of communication by other means than wireless
telegraphy or native blockade runners. It will be a forlorn hope,
a match against time, for a garrison so circumstanced is bound
to waste apace. But it is not quite so desperate a venture as at
the first blush it might appear. The Turks, in this case, count
three special points in their favour. First, the proved capacity