File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎47v] (103/834)

484 —
of their Anatolian troops, under stout hearted commandeis such
as Fakhri is, to stand long sieges with communications cut and
supplies short, and without such loss of discipline or heart, as other
armies would suffer. Second, the proved inaptitude of pure y
Arab forces for making any impression by greatly superior numbers
on strongly fortified positions. Third, and most important, at
Medina, as at Jerusalem, the sacrosanctity of the position they
propose to hold. Even if this should not deter its assailants from
using effective weapons, especially guns, valuable capital could, an
would, be made out of their aggressive action throughout the Moslem
world, and King Husein might well find victory worse than de
feat. The force of this third point will be appreciated when it is
recalled that the Turks’ main position at Medina, according to the
best Arab information, is a small fortified area round the Haram
itself. Into this they have brought their rail-head by a pro
longation of the line through the city walls, and in the Mosque
precinct they have their main ammunition dump and supply
store. It will be impossible to bombard them there without
damaging, and perhaps blowing up, parts of the Mosque and even
the Prophet’s Tomb itself.
If the Sherifial commanders feel themselves debarred, as very
likely they will, from using guns against this position, they can
only invest it and trust to the slow certainty of waste, and the
chances of epidemic and treachery—both good chances, but no
more. They will hardly hasten the end, even if they should
succeed in reducing the outposts and cutting the spring-water
conduits from Ain Zerka and Kuba. There is ground water at
no great depth all over the Medina oasis and Fakhri has an
efficient well-sinking detachment. But he might be reduced to
contaminated water, and so the chance of epidemic would be
increased.
The Turks hold but an indifferent hand in Hejaz, but they
will play such cards as they still have for all they are worth.
Should they succeed in finding a thoroughly fit garrison to leave
in Medina—fit to stand a year’s waste—and in evacuating all the
unfit and the remnant of the civil population, and withdrawing
these, together with all L. of C. troops, to Maan or Amman, they
will have scored. If disaster, partial or complete, overtakes the
evacuating force, we shall lead on points, but not yet have won the
game. Fakhri will still hold a troublesome hand. It will be
necessary, at our great expense, and to the political and military
embarrassment of King Husein, to keep the Arab southern armies
in being for many months to come ; and a centre of hostile
propaganda and rallying point for reactionary sentiment will
remain in full activity in Hejaz. How far the' Turkish G.O.C.
and any helper like I bn Rashid (should he elect to be shut up
with his present friends) may be able to spread poison among the
surrounding tribes, will depend on the closeness of the investment.
Abdullah has shown that he can close a small circumscribed area
effectively for three months, and if the outlying posts, which the