File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎73r] (154/834)

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CONVERSATIONS WITH EMIR ABDULLAH.
(To be read in connection with pp. 519-520 of the 1917 Bulletin.)
General Policy.
In conversation with Colonel Wilson and myself the Emir
Abdullah on numerous occasions referred to our treaty obligations
with Ibn Saud and the Idrisi which, he said, would always be
fully upheld by his father and himself. He always spoke
sincerely and gratefully about the help which he has received
from the British Government, and of the assistance which he
expected in the future in the moulding of the Arab race.
He wishes to bring about unity and concord in the Arabian
Peninsula by peaceful means, and considers that this can best be
attained if the several principal chiefs are completely independent
in their own dominions, on the proviso that they make some
recognition of the suzerainty of the King of the Arabs.
He said that the greatest handicaps in conducting the Arab
revolt, leaving out of account the attitude of Ibn Saud and the
Idrisi, had been the lack of trustworthy subordinates in the Arab
ranks, which had thrust an unfair burden on the shoulders of
the King and his four sons. It would be useless for the King
to try and dominate the Peninsula by force with such lieutenants,
even if he wished to, and he, personally, would like to .see a
number of strong and friendly rulers, governing justly their
subjects and acting fairly by their overlord. In this he shows a
greater wisdom than his father, who, I suspect, would prefer a
collection of puppet rulers with himself as the one strong man.
In the remarks which follow, the Emir may seem to depart
from this ideal, especially in his attitude towards Ibn Saud, but
it must be remembered that, at the present time, relations
between them are not far from the breaking point, and that he
feels that he must make out the best case possible for his own
side. It is quite probable that he does not himself believe all
the charges which he has made, for he admitted getting most ot
his information from certain border elements who were Wahhabis
to Ibn Saud and Sunnis to him and who might be reaping an
advantage by selling false information to both sides.
He is merely carrying on the duel which began when his
father originally claimed the Ateibah. He has gained ground
during the last year by lavish gifts to their chief sheikhs, and
Ibn Saud—having little money—has countered by intensifying
his Wahhabi campaign. This has alarmed the Emir who^ is,
perhaps, inclined to exaggerate his real feelings when speaking
to us.
But, strained though the situation is, it is not necessarily
incapable of solution. I cannot speak of Ibn Saud but many
conservations with the Emir convinced me that he will act fairly,
if fairly met. He frequently referred to the responsibility which
rested on the organisers of the Arab revolt, of making the
countries more peaceful and prosperous than they had been undei
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