File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎74r] (156/834)

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and for its prestige. From what I have experienced all this long
time, I find I cannot help telling you frankly that the fact of
your remaining in the ‘ Imara’ [Emirship, namely that you keep
your post as Emir] of your Fathers and Forefathers is in
dispensable to our cause [or interest]. We also wish that the
family of Abdel Aziz ibn Abdel Rahman should be next to \ ou
in authority [or it might mean succeed you] as this would
ensure unity and exchanging friendly feelings between you and
ourselves, as in this way the Arabs will become powerful and will
be looked upon with respect [or awe]. I inform you that this
idea is common among us, namely my Father and Brothers, and
I am giving you this information in my capacity of being a
member oAhe Royal Family, and as Foreign Minister to the
Hashimite Government. .
“ Therefore, be easy at mind and form your relations and
interests with H.M. the King according to these communications.”
[Note. Words in brackets are inserted by translator;
original Arabic is rather obscure.]
’ The Emir stated that this letter was received with great
pleasure by Ibn Sand, who read it aloud in his assembly and
acknowledged it suitably, saying that he was the Kings servant
and would give him all help in his power.
On the strength of this statement and after Ibn Rashid s
retreat to the railway, the Emir wrote the second letter to Ibn
Sand saying that the moment for attacking Hail was favourable
and inviting his co-operation. Ibn Sand acknowledged the
receipt of this letter, but entirely ignored the proposal, merely
making general enquiries about the Emir s health.
At that time, said the Emir, Hail was entirely unprotected
and its inhabitants and the neighbouring tribes bewildered and
without a leader or a policy. With Sherifian l-lp ,t S Ml would
have been a certainty and he could only conch.de that Ibn baud
had some ulterior motive in refusing the offer He had sa
nothing about the future possession of Hail but had been quite
prepared to see it fall into Ibn Sand’s hands. 2
2. Ibn Saud and the Wahabi Danger.
For several days after our arrival, the Emir professed to
make light of this movement which, he said, had been dangerous
two years ago but had since declined. On the arrival of the
news of Sultan ibn Bijed's raid, however (see note m this
Bulletin), he veered round and continued, during our stay, o
emphasise its seriousness. He placed all the responsibility on
Ibn Saud who, he said, was fanning the flame ol fanaticism to
further his own ambitions. .
The movement was a difficult one to counter, since all the
central Hejaz tribes entered Ibn Sami's territory every year to
net dates, and were there exposed to the full blast of W ahabi
influence. Inducements to remain were offered to them, th
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