File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎98v] (205/834)

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and defended by about 300 infantry, two guns and three or four
machine guns ; the Bedouins would make no attempt to storm the
fortified hills overlooking the station, and without infantry
co-operation all the assistance we could offer with our guns and
aeroplanes was in itself insufficient to completely silence enemy
resistance. One detached post held by twenty Turks was rushed
and captured, five Turks being killed and fifteen taken prisoners.
The ten-pounder mountain guns on Talbots did excellent work,
and their high explosive and shrapnel must have caused severe
casualties. They were in action the whole day at a distance of
2,000 yards from the main Turkish defence^. The French con
tingent operating from the north-west fired 104 rounds from
their mountain gun, and would have ably supported any advance,
had the Bedouins attempted it. The action of armoured cars
was much hampered by soft sand. They dismounted machine
guns and raked the enemy defences at close range, but infantry
support was not forthcoming.
The R.F.C. rendered valuable support, and dropped over
th ree-quarters of a ton of explosives on Mudowara station
and the defensive posts. Communication with the ft.F.C. was
impossible except by means of simple ground signals, but on
their own initiative they bombed the enemy aeroplane which
landed at Mudowara on the morning of the 23rd, and rendered it
unserviceable to leave by air.
On the morning of the 23rd all Arabs returned to Abu
bawana by Sherif Feisal s order, having run out of ammunition
and water. I he attack would probably have succeeded had the
Bedouins rushed the position at dawn. Major Maynard and
myself had made a careful reconnaissance of the position previous
to the attack, and advised Feisal to make the attempt, for once
the Turks had manned their positions they were really formidable
ones to take by storm. Sherif Feisal and Nuri Bey, however,
were in favour of a preliminary bombardment. It is difficult to
combine modern weapons with Bedouin tactics. They sat on
the hills and watched the bombardment with great interest, and
each shell fired or bomb dropped was assisted on its way by
feivent imprecations that it would fall on the heads of all the
Turks and destroy them ; as to co-operating by an infantry
advance, no attempt at it was made. The Sherifian artillery
was so ineffective as to be negligible.
The Arabs were in no way disconcerted by their failure to
take the station, and are now concentrating for a fresh offensive.”
Sherif Abdullah's Operations.
On February _7, a detachment of Abdullah’s army,
accompanied by Major Davenport, ambushed a Turkish wood
cutting party south of Bir Jedid. Five Turks were killed, two
wounded, and five mules captured. The enemy then opened
ic th a mountain gun and attempted to encircle the Arabs
who retired.