File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎292r] (592/834)

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should be informed that, unless he surrendered by midday
December 15, the Dardanelles forts would be destroyed.
The envoy, Captain Zia, formerly Fakhri’s adjutant,
reached Yenbo, after some delay en route, on December 15.
He proceeded at once to Medina, Fakhri’s time limit being
extended by seventy-two hours to enable him to deliver his
letters.
On receipt of them, Fakhri again refused to surrender,
on the ground that Clause 16 of the Armistice conditions—
providing for the retention of sufficient troops to maintain
orc t er _applied to Hejaz as well as Cilicia. Further, he
would not let the envoy leave Medina, and closely restricted
his movements within the town itself.
As soon as this was known, on December 23, a state of
war was declared to exist again, much to the delight of the
Arabs, whose impatience it had been hard to restrain.
(4) The envoy returned to Yenbo on December 24.
The Arabs there gave him a hostile reception, though
Captain Garland believes that he did his best in difficult
circumstances. He brought a further message from Fakhri
to the effect that, in addition to his military capacity, he
was defender of the Prophet’s Tomb—a duty from which
only a personal order from the Sultan could release him.
To meet this new impasse it was decided that a senior
officer should be sent at once from Constantinople to super
sede him, carrying an Imperial Irade dismissing him from
his command.
This plan is being put into effect. On January 3
H.M.S. “Archer” reached Port Said having on board a
Miralai and Haidar Bey, Turkish Minister of Justice. They
carry the necessary trade, and on reaching Medina will
declare Fakhri dismissed if he proves still impervious to
reason.
Captain Zia, on his return from Yenbo, expressed the opinion
that Fakhri would prefer death to surrender unless he were
promised a free passage with his whole force to Turkey. Money,
food and forage, he said, were scarce in Medina. But Fakhri’s
religious fanaticism, coupled with his thorough espionage system,
had enabled him to preserve remarkable discipline ; and, in the
last extremity, he could defend the Haram with 600 men for six
months.
Captain Zia appears, however, to have overrated the strength
of Fakhri’s control. On January 1, his chief of staff, Emin Bey,
gave himself up ; and his action has been the signal for whole
sale desertion. On January 3, it was reported that some 1,000
of the garrison were en route for Bir Derwish. Emin Bey has
stated that most of the remainder should follow suit almost
immediately.