File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎355r] (718/834)

doubt he will be willing to produce them. It therefore appears
very necessary that, before arbitrating, an authentic copy of
the treaty should be seen by our representatives.
The question of the official Turkish Hejaz-Nejd boundary
line could no doubt be settled by reference to Constantinople,
but it is quite possible that the 1910 treaty altogether ignored
Turkish delimitations. On the other hand, our 1915 treaty
with Ibn Saud, which included Nejd as one of his possessions,
defined no boundaries. It is reasonable to suppose, however,
that on our side it was the official Turkish boundaries of Nejd
that we had in mind when we agreed to assist Ibn Saud against
all aggression on his frontiers.
Ibn Saud is willing to let “ self-determination ” play its part
in settling the dispute. He knows well that the greater part
of the inhabitants of Khurma and Tarabah have Wahabi
inclinations, so he has nothing to lose by the application of this
doctrine.
If the people of these districts are placed under King Husein
against their wishes, it seems likely that the future for him
will be pregnant with trouble, and it might be helpful if the
Sheikhs of the Sebei and the Buqum could be given opportunities
of stating their preference when the time arrives for adjudication.
A canvass of the leading Ateibah Sheikhs would also be of use
as giving an indication of how much help the King might
eventually receive from that tribe if the Sebei and Buqum were
compelled, under the terms of the arbitration, to submit to the
King. Because, unless the King can absolutely depend on a large
amount of support from the Ateibah, it would probably be
abortive to allot (or restore, as the case may be) to him the
Wahabis of Khurma and Tarabah. Husein would have great
difficulty in establishing his authority in the district, and would
no doubt expect us to keep it quiet.
If a great Wahabi revival, through the medium of the Ikhwan,
is imminent, and if the local people are in favour of it, it is im
probable that any boundary decision will prevent its spread.
Should it eventually become necessary to repress the movement,
then the duty of all orthodox Moslem countries will be to join
in the task, and King Husein can hardly expect European
lives to be risked in a sectarian war within the Mohammedan
religion.
It is necessary to remember that, in Arabia, religion
dominates politics, and especially is this the case with the Wahabis.
“Self-determination,” therefore, means to the Arabs that they
follow the temporal leader to whom they give their religious
adherence.