Coll 29/109 'Tehran Legation: appointment of additional Counsellor' [‎160r] (319/323)

(3)
(c) the undertaking that such supervision as is necessary of certain
services e«g. famine relief ? security etc-
8„ (a) (h) and (c) are nearly all of them likely to involve
India to a greater or less cfeegree in particular cases? and arguments
on grounds of administrative necessity, quite apart from arguments
on political grounds ( to which we attach the first importance) are in
our judgment cogent-
9- As regards this last point I appreciate that arrangement
we propose is novel in character and represents a modification of
previous Foreign Office practice- But circumstances are quite special
and, given India’s close connection with this problem and its reactions
on uQ in the present circumstances, I feel no doubt that His Majesty’s
G-ovt. and Foreign Office will appreciate reasons which lead us to
advance it. I appreciate fully that Persians may put up some opposition*
but to that I attach no importance. Persia is not in a position at
moment to obstruct ue over this matter, and in my judgment any attempt
at obstruction should be over-ridden without delay. From information
now coming in it is obvioris how anxious Persia is to stand well with
us as an insurance against tne Russians. Hew post should be appropriately
additional post of Counsellor and I would ask your support in that
proposal: while ( though I realise disadvantage that he has been,
working under Legation for some time) I think the right man for it would
jo Squire, now Consul General, Meshed, whom I would replace in that post
Dy Skrine. New Counsellor would, as you will have gathered from my
suggestions above, be in effect an outpost of India at Tehran, and our
^assumption would be that he would have fullest access to all correspondence,
he brought into discussions, and haye the right to correspond direct
with my Foreign Department ( subject of course to such comminication
being seen by i* inis ter). No real difficulty ought in our view to arise
over that, given goodwill on both sides.
10. It is of. course useless to erect top storey until and unless
foundations are secure. It is in Persia itself that*'policy has to be
implemented and no amount of organisation at top will be available
without well laid arrangements in local field- As I see it the
objectives in Persia itself will broadly be two (a) to see that Persian
administration in occupied areas does not break down? and to adjust
relations bety/een the forces of occupation, the Persian authorities and
people and our Russian Allies. This may involve questions of security
•and famine relief? (b) by arrangement with Persian authorities to
secure and maintain the facilities, particularly in the matter of
communications, which we have obtained under the settlement. In some
cases, e.g. railways and ports* this will Involve a measure of direct
admin i s tr at i on.
Any such organisation will have to be in close touch both with
His Majesty r s Legation ( owing to centralisation of Persian administration)
and with Commanders in the field and much of its activity will be in the
provinces. The fact that the Commander will not be located at the
capital introduces special problems unlike those which have to be faced
in Iraq. We are considering this problem in conjunction with General
Staff and hope to telegraph our suggestions within a fdw days.
xl. Reverting to para- No, 3 above, I have carefully considered
possible names for Middle East War Council. I have consulted Auchinleck
privately? and in resvlt and after a careful scrutiny of personnel
c-v ail able oO me it©rG« I v/ould propose to detach Prior temporarily from
1 : PersiciU Guix, put in Hay to act for him, and appoint Prior to War
Council, He has the great advantage of first hand and recent knowledge
of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and preliminaries of the situation*