'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎52r] (108/454)

INCEPTION OF THE OPERATIONS 83
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reasons which do not concern us here, its despatch was decided
on by the Cabinet and it left India for East Africa in the
middle of October. It will be for the strategist of the future,
viewing the world war and its results as a whole, to consider
the effect, in Mesopotamia and elsewhere, that a different
decision might have brought about.
It was thus becoming clear that the Foreign Office, the naval
authorities at the Admiralty and the political and military
authorities in India and at the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. considered that
some action of a precautionary nature, at the head of the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , was a pressing requirement. But the Cabinet
had still to be convinced of its necessity. It was of paramount
importance to avoid any semblance of hostilities against
Turkey, the question of whose joining in the war was beginning
to tremble in the balance. On the 4th September, the Viceroy
telegraphed a reply to the enquiry of the 18th August by the
Secretary of State regarding political measures which could
be taken in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , etc.,* saying that he considered
we could rely on assistance from the Shaikhs of Mohammerah
and Kuwait, and on a friendly, or at all events, a correct attitude
towards British interests on the part of other Arab potentates
in the Gulf , that it was difficult to foresee exactly how far the
Turks would be able to appeal successfully to the Arabs ; and
that an Arab rising against the Turks would not be difficult to
start there was in any case a considerable likelihood of such a
rising but that unless we were in a position locally to maintain
order, all civilised interests and the safety of Europeans would
be endangered by such a rising. He considered that for these
and other reasons the presence of another warship in the Gulf
besides the Odin was of great importance ; and although, of
course, the assumption by us of control at Basra would be the
most effective and far reaching measure, it was then impossible
to say if we could, at any particular juncture, spare sufficient
troops to seize that place in the face of armed Turkish opposi
tion, finally, the Shaikhs of Kuwait and Mohammerah and
I bn Saud could not do much to assist us in such an operation.
The question of Arab co-operation, in the contingency of
hostilities with Turkey, was at this period being discussed and
considered. The Egyptian authorities had been approached by
a representative of an Arab Committee in Mesopotamia, asking
for British support to help them to form a united Arabian
state. The Arabs in Mesopotamia and Northern Arabia were
said to be ripe for revolt and looked for active assistance from
* See p. 78.