'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎58r] (120/454)

INCEPTION OF THE OPERATIONS
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England with Turkey, and that it was hoped that he and the
Shaikh of Kuwait would use their influence to maintain peace
in Arabia. Between the 8 th and the 13th, further telegrams
were exchanged between Home and India in which the Secretary
of State said that for the time being it was not necessary to
decide regarding Abadan. The merits of Basidu and Bahrein
for the landing were discussed, the decision being left to the
Government of India, who selected Bahrein, and informed the
Secretary of State that arrangements were being made for
Force “ D,” consisting of two mountain batteries, one company
of Sappers and Miners and one infantry brigade, to sail from
India about the 15th.
By analysing the above series of telegrams—which were
drawn up either at conferences at which the Foreign Office,
the Admiralty, the War Office and the Indian Office were
represented, or as a result of such conferences—we get the
following summary of the intentions of His Majesty’s Govern
ment : Premature hostile action against Turkey was to be
avoided, but the Arabs were to be conciliated and to be shown
that we were prepared to support* them against Turkey.
For this purpose a force was to be despatched to the Persian
Gulf, which His Majesty’s Government would have sent to
Abadan but for the protests of the Indian Government, who
particularly desired that Indian Musalmans should not have
any ground for supposing that we had aggressive intentions
towards Turkey. In addition to occupying Abadan, the
force was to protect the oil tanks and pipe-line and cover the
landing of any necessary reinforcements. As the pipe-hne
extended for over one hundred miles into Arabistan, it must
have been apparent that General Delamain’s brigade alone
could not afford it efficient protection. For this purpose,
therefore, reinforcements or assistance from the Arabs would
be necessary.
Finally the Government of India were informed that if
Turkey should become a belligerent, the management of the
expedition would devolve on them, but that instructions
* In his evidence before the Mesopotamia Commission, Lord Crewe laid
stress on the fact that a failure on our part to support the Arab Shaikhs
at the head of the Gulf might ignite a fire which would spread throughout
Arabia and even involve Mecca itself, and by setting Islam against us would
probably excite risings in Persia, Afghanistan and India; and he stated
that in a private letter to Lord Hardinge of the 9th October he had said,
" Of the various objects to be attained by sending a force up the Gulf, I have
always regarded the moral effect on the Arab chiefs as the primary, and the
protection of the oil stores as the secondary.”