'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎78v] (161/454)

136 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
operations, it seemed possible that Turkish forces from there
would be diverted against Baghdad. “ If this happened as
we should be unable to reinforce them further, we should have
either to withdraw or run the risk of a considerable disaster ”
He was of opinion that the ultimate strategical value of Baghdad
was doubtful, while it was clear that the addition to our military
responsibilities by its occupation would entail the diversion of
more troops to what was, after all, only a secondary objective
He concluded : “It will thus be seen that, however desirable
politically the seizure of Baghdad may be, the military con
siderations indicate that even success would result in our general
strategical position being weakened rather than strengthened."
On the 27th, General Barrow, the Military Secretary at the
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , was also considering Sir P. Cox’s proposal, and in his
ft^mrite of that date he analysed the situation on the following
lines. A policy of passive inactivity was to be deprecated if we
were to continue to impress the Arab and Indian world with
our ability to defeat all designs against us. Within the next
week or so the third brigade of the division would have arrived
in Mesopotamia, and General Barrett and Sir P. Cox would be
able to form a sound appreciation of the position with regard to
the Arabs. If this was favourable a forward move would be
safe, though it was premature to embark on any such ambitious
project as the occupation of Baghdad. A suitable objective
was Qurna, up to which warships like the Odin and ships of
fifteen-feet draught could proceed. No obstacle to such an
advance was known and no opposition seemed likely, so that
probably a brigade of infantry with a proportion of other anus
would suffice. The object of going to Qurna was to secure a
strong strategical point and a dominating position. Situated
at the junction of the Tigris and the old channel of the
Euphrates, it covered and controlled all the rich cultivated land
along the Shatt al Arab. Immediately to the north of Qurna
was the arid country between it and Amara and both flanks
were practically unassailable ; on the right the Hawiza marshes
reaching to near the Persian frontier and on the left the
Euphrates. The advantages of the position were:—
(1) Its commanding military value.
(2) The control it would give us of the whole navigable
water-way to the Gulf.
(3) The possession of the whole of the rich cultivated area
from Quma to the sea.
(4) The fact that it completely covered Persian Arabistan and
safeguarded it from Turkish intrigues or incursions.