'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎79v] (163/454)

HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
Cox’s proposal to advance to Baghdad ... as a matter
of fact after consultation with Beauchamp Duff I had arriwH
at the conclusion that it would be impossible to execute
present . . . ai
This conclusion was come to after the receipt of answers
from General Barrett to the Chief of the General Staff’s tel
grams of 2oth and 26th November, which more than confirmed
the views held at Indian Army Headquarters that from a mili
tary point of view the proposal was unsound. General Barrett
had reported that he had only three steamers and four iron
lighters, whose capacity was two battalions with a week’s
supply, available for navigation above Qurna, and that armed
vessels of not more than three and a half feet draught would be
necessary m case a larger force had to be moved above Quma'
Ambs 1 Were g enerall y friendly, but the Muntafik
Shaikh A^mn who had been helping the Turks had not come
m ; the local supplies and transport were only sufficient for
the inhabitants ; a small force of the enemy with two guns was
at yurna and they were also holding Ezra’s Tomb and Nasiriya;
and the enemy were well armed with good supplies of ammu
nition and were living on the country.
On 29th November, General Barrett telegraphed to India
the following appreciation of the situation. It is, however,
to be noted that this telegram never reached India, and it was
not till 18th December that General Barrett realised it had
not reached its destination and repeated it.f “ It appears
esirable, so that our position at Basra may be consolidated,
Q urna a fortified post and another five miles north
o mbair at Shaiba. These will be in addition to the Basra
garrison. In order to destroy the Turkish gunboat Marmariss
and any other armed vessels that may be sent to oppose our
advance by the lurks, two or more river steamers of light
raught carrying four-inch B.L. guns should form the naval
orce. Upon the decision as to whether you propose advancing
to Baghdad or not, and upon the declaration of our permanent
occupation of the country or otherwise, must depend the
military strength of this garrison. The attitude of the Shaikh
of Kuwait has always been satisfactory, and in our immediate
neighbourhood the tribes are disposed to be most friendly.
Vlien once they are told th at we have come to stay it may be
.i ^ ee iP- Cox s telegram of 23rd November ante. Ajaimi remained on
the Turkish side throughout the war.
rJ A i Cl ^ Ck instituted . between the Chief of the General Staff, India and
Tenera arrett to obviate such miscarriage of telegrams did not, owing
pparen y to a clerical error, have the desired effect in this instance.