'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎91r] (186/454)

SITUATION IN PERSIA
159
The difficulties of organising any really formidable Arab force
and of advancing with it across the desert were obviously con
siderable. Consequently, General Barrett came to the conclusion
that an attack on Basra from the west was a less immediate
danger than an advance by Sulaiman Askari against Qurna.
Accordingly, on the 10th January, he issued orders for the force
at Qurna to be reinforced. It was now to be made up to two
squadrons of cavalry, four batteries of field and mountain
artillery, two companies of sappers and miners, and two brigades
of infantry, with half a battalion of pioneers. In the meantime,
the waters had risen and were still rising, and the ground to the
north of Qurna on the right bank of the Tigris was becoming
unfit for military operations. On the left bank, to the north
of Muzaira'a, the water had not encroached to the same extent;
and it was consequently decided to construct a defensive
position on this bank to be held in addition to Qurna. The
rain and inundations, besides causing much additional work,
entailed great discomfort to the troops, whose tents were
frequently flooded.
At this period, news was received of the decisive defeat of
the Turks by the Russian army in the Caucasus. The effect
of this in Mesopotamia was likely to be considerable, as it seemed
probable that some of the Turkish reinforcements recently
reported as en route to Mesopotamia would now be diverted to
Armenia or Kurdistan. On the other hand, a Turco-Kurdish
force was advancing through Persian territory on Tabriz, which
the Russians evacuated. This re-acted on the situation in Persia
where, since the middle of November, the Persian Government
had been protesting to the Russian Legation and the Turkish
Embassy against their respective troops’ violation of Persian
neutrahty. For some time previous to the war, it had been
obvious that the positions on the Persian frontier occupied
by Russian and Turkish troops would lead to some such
violation in the event of hostilities. But Persia was powerless
to prevent it. Germany exploited the situation and utilised
the overt hatred of Russia in Persia to the disadvantage of the
British. If a second large independent Moslem State could be
brought into the war on the side of Germany, the effect in
Afghanistan and India would be considerable. By the end
of December our Minister in Tehran reported that the country
was becoming restless under the untiring hostile propaganda ;
and by the end of January, news was received from the same
source that Swedish officers of the Persian gendarmerie were
participating in the intrigues against us.