'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎111r] (226/454)

POSITION AT SHAIBA
199
Barrett’s departure, devolved temporarily on the senior
brigade commander in the division, Major-General Fry, who
was in command at Shaiba. Major-General MeDiss, com
manding the 30th Infantry Brigade, was, however, senior
to Major-General Fry, and as General Nixon decided on the
11th to send the 30th Infantry Brigade and the 30th Mountain
Battery to Shaiba next day, General Melliss would naturally
assume command. The 6th Divisional staff was at the same
time to proceed to Shaiba, and was placed at the disposal of
General Melliss. General Nixon also arranged to proceed
himself to Shaiba on the morning of the 12th. He had come
to the conclusion that, as it did not cover its communications
with Basra, the position at Shaiba was unsatisfactory, as a
Turkish advance in strength might cut the Shaiba garrison off
and force them to adopt a passive defence.* In such an event
it would be difficult to reinforce and supply Shaiba, for the
direct water route, unfordable by men and animals, was still
too shallow for anything but heliums, and even they could
not always cross. General Nixon had landed imbued with
the opinion that it would be best to take offensive action
against the Turks whenever they came within reach and
before they could concentrate in strength. But, as matters
stood, he agreed with General Barrett that reinforcements
should not be sent to Shaiba till the latest possible moment
on account of the supply difficulty. This, he was informed,
would be lessened shortly, as the inundation would become
passable by sailing boats. He determined, therefore, to go
to Shaiba and see the local conditions for himself.
On the morning of the 11th, General Fry .reported the
advance towards Shaiba of what appeared to him to be the
advanced guard of the main Turco-Arab force, and he con
sidered that this indicated the probability of serious hostilities
within the next day or two. Our cavalry had located hostile
mounted troops in, and to the west of, Barjisiya wood ; a
column of some four thousand Turkish infantry were advanc
ing from the direction of Nukhaila on Shwaibda ; and a con
siderable number of Arabs could be seen to the north-west
of Shwaibda. During the same afternoon our cavalry
reconnoitring patrols were forced to withdraw by superior
numbers of hostile cavalry ; but these fell back into Barjisiya
* This position, it should be noted, had been occupied long before the floods
set in ; and it had been reported that no position existed which covered
the crossing of the inundation and where drinking water was to be found.
After the battle of Shaiba such a position was found.