'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎136r] (276/454)

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DIFFICULTIES AT QURNA
detailed instructions had to be issued for the information and
guidance of those who were to take part in the attack, including
fists of the gear, stores, ammunition and rations to be carried
in each of the various vessels.
The fourth battalion of the 17th Brigade (119th Infantry)
were moved up to Qurna from Basra on the 11th May, and next
day General Nixon visited Ourna himself in company with
General Townshend. The brigade commanders and chief
staff officers of the force that was to be employed had by this
time heard from General Townshend of the action that was to
be taken ; and on the 13th General Nixon at Qurna announced
to the troops his intention of advancing on Amara. Four
days later, he telegraphed to India the appreciation of the
situation which has already been referred to, in which he
mentioned his intended action on the Tigris.
General Townshend in his book “ My Campaign in Mesopo
tamia ” describes his misgivings and those of the commander
of the 17th Brigade and his officers at this projected frontal
attack in boats ; for they were all impressed by the strength
of the Turkish position. From the brigade and regimental
officers’ point of view the proposal appeared to have many
disadvantages *, these officers had at this time no great con
fidence in their men’s ability to attain sufficient skill in
manoeuvring the hundreds of bclluyns in suitable formations,
and this, they felt, would aggravate the loss of control by
officers over the men during the fighting which the dispersion
in boats must in any case entail; it would, they considered, be
impossible to develop and direct a sufficient volume of fire
from the infantry boats ; and there did not appear fobe
much chance of attending to or removing the wounded. They
could not help recalling that the Turks had been preparing
their defensive positions for the last four months and it seemed
to them that, unless it was considered necessary for political
reasons to advance at once, it would be better to wa if ^
July when the floods would subside and the attack could be
carried out over dry land. General Townshend says that the
mines reported to be strewn in the river caused him an t ic
Senior Naval Officer some uncertainty as to whether the war
ships would be able to develop sufficient gunfire to enable the
infantry to assault; and he regarded the possibility of the
naval ships being sunk by the field guns in the Turkish redoubts
as a real danger, as the mined and obstructed channel of the
Tigris—sufficiently difficult of navigation without these—must
limit considerably the manoeuvring power of the ships.