'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎148v] (301/454)

272 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
the question of an advance to Baghdad. They were aware
that many of the political authorities at Home and in India
advocated its occupation, mainly owing to the great moral
and therefore settling—effect it would have not only on the
Arabs in Mesopotamia, but also in Persia, Afghanistan and
India * The fact that the leading Russians to the south of
Lake Van were now less than thirty marches off Baghdad
indicated that its occupation might soon be brought up as
an operation to be seriously considered. The intentions of the
Russians were not known, but, as they were as much concerned
as we were to preserve the neutrality of Persia, it appeared
possible that they might be contemplating an advance on Mosul
or Baghdad, in order to block the way to Persia, and that we
might be asked to co-operate.| In their appreciation, the General
Staff came to the conclusion that were General Nixon to be
sent certain reinforcements—which they placed at one cavalry
brigade, two infantry brigades and twenty-four guns, which
they considered India could spared—the occupation of Baghdad
in the early future was a feasible operation. The main reasons
which led to this conclusion were : the position of the Russian
forces about Lake Van ; the demoralisation of the Turkish
troops after their recent defeats by the British and Russians ;
and the Turkish preoccupation with the Dardanelles operations
which would detract from their ability to reinforce Baghdad.
It is interesting to note that the Turkish General Staff admit
that at this period they would have had great difficulty in
stopping a determined British advance up the Tigris.
In regard to Kut, the General Staff considered that it afforded
an advantageous position on which to base a further advance
on Baghdad ; and that in any case a British force there was
well placed strategically to protect Basra vilayet from any
Turkish advance from Baghdad and to restrict Turkish traffic
by river between Baghdad and Nasiriya to the Euphrates.
This opinion was also based, it should be noted, on the idea
that the Shatt al Hai was a navigable route between Kut and
* In December 1914, it had been noted at the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. that from
a political point of view the occupation of Baghdad was so desirable as to
be practically essential; the Foreign Office would also have welcomed its
occupation ; and on the 12th February 1915, in a telegram to Lord Crewe,
Lord Hardinge had indicated Baghdad as our probable ultimate objective.
t On the 25th June the War Office learnt that the Russians intended to
advance on Bitlis from Van, and not till the 20th July did they find out
that the Russians were really manoeuvring to turn the Turkish right south
of Erzerum.
I This opinion was not shared by the Viceroy, nor apparently by the
Commander-in-Chief in India.