'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎164r] (332/454)

DISPOSITIONS OF THE COMBATANTS
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At Ali Gharbi, on the Tigris, under General Delamain were
one troop 7 th Lancers, the 82nd Field and a section of the
104th Heavy Batteries, half the 22nd Sapper Company, the
16th Infantry Brigade (Dorsets, 104th and 117th) and the 22nd
Punjabis. Here also were the Comet, Shaitan and two 4'7-inch
guns in horse-boats.
At Amara were the headquarters of the 6th Division,
7th Lancers, the 76th Field Battery and one section each of
the 86th and 104th Heavy Batteries, four 15-pounders, a
spare 18-pounder in a barge, half the 22nd Sapper Company,
the 17th Infantry Brigade (Oxfords, 103rd and 119th) and
the bridging train.
On the Tigris line of communication were the 20th Punjabis
at Qala Salih and half the 66th Punjabis at Qurna.
At Ahwaz were the 6th Cavalry Brigade (“ S ” Battery
R.H.A., 23rd and 33rd Cavalry) ; and at Basra were two
squadrons 16th Cavalry, 23rd Mountain Battery, Sirmur
Sappers and the 33rd Infantry Brigade (4th Rajputs and half
66th Punjabis). The 11th Rajputs were about to leave Basra
for Bushire, where the British garrison consisted of a squadron
16th Cavalry, five captured Turkish guns (recently sent from
Basra) and the 96th Infantry.
The Turkish numbers and dispositions were estimated as
follows At and near Kut, the reformed 38th Division with
a strength of about 5,000 rifles and 19 guns; retiring on Kut
from Nasiriya the remnants* of the 35th Division, consisting
of about 2,000 rifles ; and at or near Baghdad, the 37th Reserve
Division totalling about 2,700 rifles with two guns.
General Nixon’s memorandum of the 24th June dealing with
the question of an advance to Kut, which was mentioned in
the last chapter, was received at Army Headquarters in India
on the 6th July. General Nixon considered that the occupation
of Kut would consolidate our military position and would have
considerable advantages. By concentrating at Kut, the Turks
threatened both Amara and Nasiriya, and this forced us to
divide our striking force so as to garrison both places strongly
and to hold a large reserve in a central position, such as Qurna.
If we ourselves occupied Kut and concentrated our striking
force there, we should cover Nasiriya'j' to a considerable extent
* The actual numbers and movements of these were uncertain. After the
action of the 24 th July they had escaped detection by our aeroplanes. The
Turkish troops were said to have stripped off their uniforms and to be
making their way north in disorganised bodies without arms.
| It is to be noted that by this time General Nixon had learned that steamers
could only move down the Shatt al Hai as far as Shatrat al Muntafik.