'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎175r] (354/454)

TURNING ATTACK LOSE DIRECTION
323
for attack, the general direction ordered being west-south-west.
General Delamain's own force on the left was deployed with
the half battalion 117th Mahrattas in front, supported by the
22nd Sapper Company and the Dorsets echeloned on the left
rear as reserve. General Hoghton, on the right, deployed his
infantry in two lines on a 1,200 yards frontage ; the leading
line consisting, from the right, of the 20th Punjabis, Oxfords,
and 22nd Punjabis, and the second line, from the right, of the
104th Rifles, 103rd Mahrattas, and 119th Infantry.
Between 5.15 and 5.30 a.m. General Hoghton and the
cavalry moved off, the latter—who had been over the ground
previously—proceeding correctly towards the passage between
the Suwaikiya and Ataba marshes, in accordance with their
instructions, while General Delamain’s force remained in
position in order to allow General Hoghton time to develop
his turning movement.
When the sun rose just after 6 a.m., General Hoghton found
marsh on his left. Being doubtful as to the accuracy of the
sketch map issued to the troops, and thinking that the water
on his left was probably an isolated swamp that had been
omitted from the map, he continued for a short while without
changing direction. The growing daylight, however, soon
showed him that the water on his left was the Ataba marsh
and it became apparent that his force, confused by the dim
light at the start and attracted by the movement of the
cavalry to their right, had lost direction and were marching
through the passage • between the Ataba and Suwaikiya
marshes. When this change of direction was observed by
General Delamain from the position of deployment, he sent
orders (received by General Hoghton at 6.35 a.m.) not to go
any farther northward, but to advance against the Turkish
left. General Hoghton replied, however, that he was now so
far to the north that he was committed to go round the Ataba
marsh, and rather than retrace his steps in order to make a
fresh start, he considered it more prudent to continue rapidly
round the marsh, as this course would bring him out in rear
of the enemy’s position. General Delamain concurred and
sent the 76th Field Battery to join General Hoghton.
The cavalry in advance of him, after driving back some
hostile mounted troops, reached the northern end of the
Ataba marsh by 7 a.m., and then moved westward.
Soon after 7 a.m. the officer commanding the 76th Field
Battery reported to General Hoghton that his battery ran
a great danger of being bogged if it continued to follow the