File 1283/1913 Pt 5 'MESOPOTAMIA TRADE Issue of new Trade Report' [‎90v] (176/270)

2
German
cjmpetition.
German political
aims.
British shipping
companies.
The recommendations which were made by these two Commissioners for
the improvement of British trade will be discussed later.
3. Anxiety was next aroused by the growing success of German trade in
V,d, Appendix i. Mesopotamia and Mr. George Lloyd
was despatched to report on the situation
in 1907. At the moment when war broke out, German trade was rapidly
forging ahead and their shipping was a thorn in the flesh to the British
companies.
The total value of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. sea-borne trade, excluding coasting
and local trade, was, in 1906, £3,205,000 and of this the British and Indian
share was £6,467,000 or 79 per cent. The German share was about £371,000
only, but it had increased from about 2 per cent, in 1895 to 4J per cent! in
1906. The figures for the year 1913-14 show that the total sea-borne trade of
the Gulf, excluding coasting and local trade, was about £12,482,000, the
British and Indian share being approximately £9,600,000 or about 76 per
cent. The German share was £1,154,000 or 9 per cent, of the total Gulf trade.
It must be remembered, however, that the figures for India included a con
siderable quantity of continental as well as British goods transhipped for the
Gulf at Indian ports. Further the trade statistics are not the sole index of
German competition and attention must also be paid to shipping. In 1906
most of the steam vessels, which comprised 91 per cent, of the tonnage eno-ao-ed
in the Gulf steamer trade, were under the British flag. The total entrances
of shipping at Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ports in 1906 amounted to 1,964,000 tons of
which British and British Indian accounted for 1,685,000 tons or 85 per cent
The German share had risen from about '8 per cent, in 1895 to about 4 per
cent, in 1906. In 1913-14, the total entrances amounted to 2,125,200 tons
of which the British and British Indian share was 1,719,000 tons or 80 per
cent. In clearances the percentage was about the same. The German share
m 1913-14 in entrances and clearances rose to 14 per cent, and 9 per cent,
respectively. The cargoes ^of German ships consisted largely of goods carried
for other European countries.
4. It will be seen that the pecuniary value of the Gulf trade was no
great matter and British commerce would not have been very seriously
affected if the Gulf and its trade had been swept out of existence. Any
sustained commercial competition in the Gulf, however, inevitably reacted
upon the British political position, and it was abundantly clear that the real
object of the German operations was not primarily to extend commerce but to
secure a political status in the Gulf with an eye to future developments
German commercial enterprise in the Gulf was, and would have been for some
years to come, backed by the German Government to whatever extent might
be requisite to insure success for the grandiose political designs that w^ere
afoot. German ambition contemplated a huge economic domain stretching
from the North Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Nile, which would exert
pressure upon the British Empire at its most sensitive points, namely Egypt
and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . The railway from Berlin to Baghdad and the Persian
Gulf was to become the vital nerve in German economic life and policy, and
money spent in financing commercial attacks upon British supremacy in the
Gulf was, therefore, a politically remunerative investment.
It is unnecessary here to recapitulate the story of German intrigue and
its highly successful result. Suffice it to say that just before the°war the
Germans had accomplished their object of maintaining German control over
the section of the Turkish Railway which essentially affected British interests
viz., that between Baghdad and Basrah, and they had also managed to secure
representation on, and a share of the capital in, the new Anglo-Ottoman con
cern which was formed for the navigation of the Tigris. In addition serious
competition against Messrs. Lynch Brothers was started on the Karun river
between Mohammerah and Ahwaz, and on the Lynch road to Ispahan.
. .*■*■ Such special measures as may seem desirable for the development of
British commerce on both shores of the Gulf and in Mesopotamia will be
dealt with later, but attention should be directed in the first place to the
essential importance of securing advantages for British shipping.
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