File 2764/1904 Pt 5 'Baghdad Railway: Anglo-Turkish negotiations; concessions proposed in respect of Kowait; negotations with Hakki Pasha in London; Anglo-Turkish agreement.' [‎173v] (359/536)

boundary on the Shatt-el-Di’aiji. A considerable strip of _ territory would thus be
relinquished to Turkey, especially if we consider Persia s original claim—the course of
the marsh channel from west of Hawizeh until it reaches the Shatt-et-Arab. Persia
can afford to do this, for, although the area involved is an extensive one, with irrigable
potentialities which it is hard to estimate, it is nevertheless probable that the nomad
occupation and cultivation by Shi eh Arab tribes under Persia would remain unaffected,
and that Turkish subjects and Turkish influence would continue to be as non-existent
and unknown east of the natural boundary as they are under existing conditions.
8 . As regards (c), I can only say that nothing in Mr. Parker’s memorandum
enables me to alter the view expressed in my telegram dated Mohammerah, the
5 th May.
I would refer to the following passage, based on the legal opinion of
Sir E. Davidson, Mr. Hurst, and Mr. Malkin, and quoted from the Foreign Office
letter of the 2>lst May, 1912 (No. 22934) to the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. :—
“ Sir E. Grey is advised that under normal conditions there is no doubt a
presumption that each riparian owner owns on his side of the river usque ad medium
Alum aquae, but that, in the present case, that presumption has by implication
undoubtedly been swept away by the terms of the Treaty of Erzeroum (1847), the
effect of which teas to give Turkey the whole waterway.”
/ would also refer to the view of Admiral Slade, Sir A. Hirtzel, and. Mr. Hurst
(see joint letter of the 15th May, 1912, to Sir E. Grey (No. 20863)).— A. P.
9. In conclusion, I would urge that having regard to the fact that our commercial
stake and interests in Southern Persia, present and potential, now mainly centre in
Arabistan, and are bound up with the maintenance of the Sheikh of Mohammerah’s
position and the strengthening of our special relations with him, we have everything to
lose by a course of action (the failure to safeguard the status quo which has been
regarded and treated by the present generation as the established order of things),,
which will tend greatly to discredit the value of our engagements and support, and
create in the minds of the Arab public in the Gulf and the native rulers in treaty with
us a feeling of apprehension and uncertainty which we can by no means, especially at
this juncture, afford to disregard.
Our attitude will, in fact, be regarded as a crucial test of our sincerity and ability
to make good our engagements, and I would add the personal opinion that the increased
confidence and frank reliance in us, which the Sheikh of Koweit has shown within the
last two years, has been due less to anything that we have done for him than to the
practical demonstration in the case of Mohammerah of the substantial and moral value
of our steadfast friendship and support : I should view with very great concern any
action calculated to weaken those sentiments.
There is a consensus of opinion as to the importance of obtaining the most
favourable settlement possible for the sheikh, due regard being had at the same
time to our general relations with Turkey, to legal and treaty considerations, and to
the expediency of not arousing misgivings as to the justice of our attitude in Turkey
inhere the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, our proteges, have largely invested
in real estate, and might suffer from resentment entertained against His Majesty’s
Government. Whether our attitude can be such as to insist—in the face of possible
Turkish opposition—-upon the continued exercise of jurisdiction by the Sheikh of
Mohammerah over his tribesmen resident in admittedly Turkish territory (e.g., on
the right bank of the Shatt-el-Arab) is I think a moot point ; our action in regard
to the Zain incident of 1910 was, as I understand it, inspired by the outrage
committed against the sheikh’s relatives rather than by a determination to resist
acts of lawf ul sovereignty and administration by the Turkish authorities on Turkish
soil. Sir G. Barclay, in his letter of the 8 th May, 1912, states that he understood
that our assurances to the sheikh, with regard to his jurisdiction, were confined to
Persian territory. — A. P.
of sending
O
letter
In order to save time, I have taken the liberty
direct to His Majesty’s Foreign and India Offices.
I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and His Majesty’s Consul-
General for Ears, &c.