File 2764/1904 Pt 5 'Baghdad Railway: Anglo-Turkish negotiations; concessions proposed in respect of Kowait; negotations with Hakki Pasha in London; Anglo-Turkish agreement.' [‎254r] (532/536)

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and to the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammera. The kind of measures which
we should take are indicated in the Government of India’s letter No. 24 of
15th February 1912' :i: ‘; and, if driven to it, we should declare a Protectorate
over Koweit. The strength or weakness of our position would then depend
largely on the state of our relations with Germany. But it would seem that
Germany would have no ground for taking exception to our action if we
could tell her that we had been (and still were) anxious to make an arrange
ment with her, but had found the Turks so irreconcilable that they would
not even accept the free hand for the railway which we had offered them.
This contingency is mentioned merely for the sake of completeness. It is
almost incredible that it should occur at a time when more than for many
vears past Turkish interests clamour for the goodwill of Great Britain.
Rear-Admiral Sir Edmond Slade has read and agrees with all the above
remarks.
A. H.
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
6th June 1912.
APPENDIX.
From Viceroy, 29th May 1912.
Private. Your private telegram dated 25th instant. Bagdad Railway.
From an Indian point of view there can be no possible doubt whatever as to
relative advantages of the two proposals. We infinitely prefer the proposal
for a 50 per cent, participation for ourselves in the Gulf section, leaving the
remainder for disposal as Turkey may wish. We have always felt a ^O or
25 per cent, participation must necessarily involve a loss of prestige in
regions adjoining Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. (see secret telegram of 23rd March 1911), and
that it might possibly become necessary some day to give compensation to
France and Russia elsewhere for their continued support of our interests in
Mesopotamia. With a 50 per cent, share we can make practically sure
against differentiation in rates. In considering all questions affecting
Mesopotamia, it is advisable to bear in mind that the situation is a fluid one,
and it is difficult to foresee what the position there may be in 20 years’ time.
Careful as we should therefore be to do all in our power to consolidate our
own position and to establish a lien for the future, we feel strongly that no
concession in Mesopotamia or elsewhere should be permitted to weaken our
position of predominance in the Gulf where we are able and should continue
to be able to assert ourselves in maintaining it against all comers.
* i.e., removal of Turkish light vessel, buoys, &c. ; ejection of Turks from Bubiyan and
El Katr (including El Bidaa) ; occupation of dao.