File 756/1917 Pt 1 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 1 to 65’ [‎418v] (841/1240)

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undoubtedly it and attitude|
£A=|£.M£% P "d I ™»cyCo““l“3
with the King o£ ,ij„iance of the Ateibah and of Qasim
grievances concerning b J ous kinsmen the Araif, but values
Md rations w ith ourselves, and possibly also
too highly his g of which the Kin g of the Hejaz disposes,
to break"he peace. He has written (under suggestion) friendly
fette- to th
chief "mes^Vtheikhs of Kuweit and Muhammerah, having
had no personal quarrels in the past with Emir Husein, are
moreTrankly amenable to our policy in regard to the King of
Hie Heiaz • but no more than Ibn Saud do they yet concede to
him, in correspondence, the style and title of a king. With
Ibn Rashid, the Emir at one time hoped to come to terms
but that hope has died with the former s open acceptance of
Turkish allies and provision of assistance to the Turkish forces
in Heiaz • and Sherifs Abdullah and Feisal have declared their
intention of dealing faithfully with Ibn Rashid as an irrecon-
cileable foe once they have done with Turks. Finally, the Imam
Yahya is not personally hostile to the King of Hejaz, while his
greatest vassal, Nasir Mabkhut of the Hashid, is inclined to be
friendly ; but neither is free at present to adopt a foreign policy
tn that, of the Turks.
Certainly at the present moment the prospect of Arabia
united under either the King of the Hejaz or anyone else seems
very remote. The “ Arab Cause ” is evidently a very weak
cement in the peninsula ; dislike of the Turk is stronger, and
a desire to stand well with us is perhaps stronger still. Should
the Turk disappear, it is the last bond which will have to take
the strain.
The Arab Advance on Wejh.
When the deadlock in the Medina—Hamra area declared
itself in October, 1916, the new idea of an attack on the Turkish
rear at El-Ala, by way of Wejh, was brought forward. The
situation in the South was that the Turks held Medina too
strongly for direct attack by the Arab forces, and that Feisal
held the Kheif—Milif hills too strongly for direct attack by the
Turkish forces. In the rear, almost blockaded in Rabugh, lay
Sidi Ali profitlessly with his army.
Feisal decided to carry out the northern expedition to Wejh,
and to do it himself. He, therefore, brought up Sidi Zeid
to Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Safra, and transferred to him the whole of his Harb
forces and his Southern Juheinah. He then withdrew to Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows.
Yambo to organize a force of Northern Juheinah for the march
on Wejh.