File 756/1917 Pt 1 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 1 to 65’ [‎524r] (1052/1240)

ARABIA.
Hejaz.
A Year of Revolt.
The 9th Shaaban, which falls this year on May 30, is the
anniversary of Emir Hnsein’s definite rupture wilh the Turks.
His standard indeed, had been raised four days earlier outside
Medina by his sons, Ali and Feisal ; but the 9th Shaaban,
which heard the first shots fired at Mecca and Jiddah, has been
adopted as the official Day of Independence. On this occasion
the following telegram has been sent by the High (Commissioner
of Egypt to King Husein : “ On this fortunate 9th Shaaban, on
which day, last year, Your Majesty’s troops victoriously took the
field at Mecca and Jiddah, I beg to offer Your Majesty my cordial
congratulations on the completion of a first year of liberty and
my sincere hopes that the years to come may be equally
fortunate for your Majesty and the Arab Nation.”
The outbreak of the Hejaz Revolt, as is well known, was
premature. The original plan was for August, but the Emir’s
hand was forced by the appearance in Medina of a picked body
of 3,000 Turks, destined to escort the Stotzingen Mission.
Neither he nor we were at all ready in early June, 1916,
and it was only with the greatest difficulty that a minimum of
sufficient assistance in material could be scraped together to
ensure initial success. But for the prompt co-operation of the
Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , who sent indispensable artillery from Khartum, and of
the S.N.O., Red Sea Patrol, both Jiddah and Mecca might have
defied attack for long enough ; nor would Taif have fallen in
time for the Pilgrimage in early October.
The comparative ease with which early successes over
considerable bodies of trained troops in fortified positions were
obtained, was, of course, due to the isolation of the Turks in
Southern Hejaz, some 300 miles from any base connected by a
decent system of communication with the rest of the Empire,
and also to their very inadequate equipment of munitions and
other supplies. If there existed any misconception about these
successes, it was soon to be corrected by what happened at
Qunfudah, at Medina, and on the Darb es-Sultani. That the
Heiaz Bedouins were simply quernleros, and not of good quality
at that, had been amply demonstrated, even in the early sieges;
and it was never in doubt that they would not attack or
withstand ^Turkish regulars unless these were at the last
extremity. Our efforts, therefore, have been directed, almost
from the first, to finding, in addition to material assistance,
some elements out of which a trained force could be formed.
Syrian refugees, Arab prisoners of war, and a few ex-Ottoman
soldiers of Arab race were the only material which we could