Coll 6/7(2) 'The Yemen: Relations between H.M.G. and the Yemen.' [‎68v] (147/732)

V
Civ'l lack of tribal co-operation. No British Officer was sent to control and
( ‘ V) co oXate the operations of the tribesmen, nor was wireless telegraphy
or any other adequate method of communication between the Audhahs
(v) The aircraft did not strike far enough back with the result that the Imam,
( who was too remote to feel the effects of the bombing, was m no way
deterred from ordering the reoccupation of ’Audi,ah territory at the first
S Since 1 mT the Zeidis have remained in occupation of Adh Dhahir Plateau
The'’Audhah Sesmen of'the occupied area, who are at heart loyal to the ’Audi,ah
Xan with the notable exception of the near relations of Ins predecessor, and their
sm U following) have been disarmed and are subjected to the severest oppression
and maltreatment by the Zeidi authorities in Al Berdha “ f^ hopeX
to recognize the permanent authority of the Imaim The /enlis ai, i op . _r
means to force the ’Audhah Sultan, who now resides m Az Zara at the^foot of Al Koi,
to break his treaty with His Majesty’s Government and to transfer his allegiance to
the Imarn^ ;s a]readv tellinf j on the tribesmen of Adh Dhahir, and both they
and the ’Audhali Sultan realize that they are dependent on British assistance if the
occupied territory is to be freed from the Zeidi yoke. The Sultan is however,
disappointed and disheartened by the fact that such ass,stance has not yet been forth-
coming.
The Aim to he Attained.
5. To compel the Imam of the Yemen to withdraw all Zeidi forces from ’Audhah
territory on Adh Dhahir Plateau.
Factors affecting the Attainment of the Aim.
6. Time and Space .—
(i) The situation is rapidly approaching a point where fresh developments are
almost inevitable, and unless we are prepared to assist the Audhah sue i
developments may eventually have very adverse effects on the rest of tne
Aden Protectorate, and may necessitate a greater military effort than is
now required. . .
(ii) Weather conditions in the spring normally bring about the formation ot
heavy cloud masses over Adh Dhahir plateau and the edge of Al Kor,
which would seriously impede both air and ground operations. During
the summer and autumn meteorological conditions are generally favourable,
(hi) Adh Dhahir Plateau is situated approximately 100 miles from Aden and
5 miles from Lodar—the capital of the ’Audhali Sultan.
(iv) Rada’, a Zeidi garrison town through which the lines of communication
between Al Beidha and Sana’a pass, is 120 miles from Aden, and is there
fore within easy flying range.
(v) Advanced landing grounds exist in numerous parts of the Aden Protectorate,
which bring all possible air objectives both in the occupied area and in
Zeidi territory within effective bombing range.
7. Relative Strengths.——
(i) Zeidi Forces. —The latest intelligence reports estimate the strength of the
Zeidi forces in Al Beidha district including Adh Dhahir, as about 1,500.
In the event of protracted operations, or for the purpose of launching a
counter attack, these could be strongly reinforced by troops from the
Yemen after some delay. They include about 400 regulars, but the
remainder are comparatively well armed and amenable to control.
(ii) 'Audhali Forces. —The estimated number of ’Audhali fighting men avail
able in Al Hadhn district for offensive operations against the Zeidis on
the top of Al Kor is 2,700. The majority of these are in possession of
arms, but an issue of rifles and ammunition would be required to increase
the proportion and k> replace unserviceable arms and arms for which
ammunition is not available (Martini-Henry). 650 rifles for this purpose
are at present held by the Aden Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. .
(hi) Possible ’Auddiali Allies. —The ’Audhali are on peaceable terms with their
neighbouring tribes, who would almost certainly come to their assistance