Coll 6/7(2) 'The Yemen: Relations between H.M.G. and the Yemen.' [‎81r] (172/732)

the Yemen
406
Hu
E ^ hjt
lift »!
405
The Imam of
[ 28 June 1933 ]
d ot i Sultan of the Audali could put up against
that him. That would be a most unfor-
ite - tunate result, and it does seem rather
obk ^ hard, after having put himself under
. p ftotft ‘v.our protection, that we should do
, t 0lt (){ Mp s no thing from the point of honour to dis-
00 charge our responsibility towards him
0{ , t ^ P% a ,nd his tribes-people. iSurely we do not
: want another instance to occur in which
mt °ry o{ | WG have encouraged people to come
‘ % mder qur protection and then have sur-
®ther aiap.hendei^ them into the hands of the
: east ' Tkj- memy, so to speak ? I think it would be
^ e( l into •?. nost unfortunate if that occurred in this
ana tie , ;ase.
S1 toted oi; This was an absolutely undeserved, un-
revoked, and wanton attack upon their
tile W#’s territory, and I should have thought it
'^isattet, point of honour and our primary duty
productive, kio take steps to rescue him from this
Hum's troops [jr; osition, and also to obtain the release
^°ie oithewthf these prisoners who, I imagine, are
[ ey seized tlie till held by the Imam. But if that is
in co-operac; ot sufficient to get the Government to
^selves, cbe ike the necessary action, there comes
out oi the State, i also the q uestio11 of our own self '
it Force mb: derest. Supposing the Sultan of the
his troops n udali went to war with the Imam, he
occumed tlVi-'Ould most assuredly be defeated, and
; . . len the Imam would be entitled to hold
t ; m rr, 1 .. 11 the territory now occupied by the
G L udali tribe. That would have very
t irious consequences to which I will refer
7 taxation on t£ £ a m p nil te. On the other hand, getting
' ne red of the present unsatisfactory posi-
and as tar a;. on> g u itan might make terms with
oit twenty ie Jmam of the Yemen so as to secure
nary reason fe ;:, m6 protection. It must be remembered
ostages. Iheie a t these tribes in the Aden hinterland
heir being hosts .0 comparatively small tribes, but they
vernment Papertltpe a very warlike people, and no in-
y hostage is r~ vidual tribe can feel secure unless they
as a pledge fe we some power in the background to
■e simply prisoner; otect their interests. In this case it
1 by the Imam, mild be either our power at Aden or
e( j“ e power of the Imam of the Yemen
nnaturally, their E the north. They must have someone
; terly, and has re ly upon.
ear, as 1 The Zaidis, that is, the people from
jjo give him Pfe- : e Yemen, are very hard and rather
:eue him hoiE utal in their methods. The Shafias, or
have done e ;: 3 people in the Aden Protectorate, have
to help him tor intensely religious dislike of them.
^ result is ^.erefore, nothing but necessity would
k he now s® ike these two parties come together,
^ at . if Ihatw t fear of isolation may drive the Sultan
alin 6 'iev beesitf - recognise the suzerainty of the Imam.
0113 P 1 4 bis nod are say the noble Earl who replies to
iam ’ Jlaris 1 - will be able to say whether there was
iplined au t in 1926 a imore or less distinct promise 1
p to overcome®!-
given to the then Sultan that his griev
ance would be rectified, and that the
Imam’s troops would be driven out of
the Audali country. In any case, I believe
we gave more or less of an undertaking
to the then Sultan because he was
wobbling in his allegiance and undecided
whether he should join with the Imam
or side with us. By our assuring him that
everything would come right in the end
he was persuaded to remain faithful to
the Protectorate. But year by year the
old condition of affairs goes on. I recently
paid a visit to the country of the Sultan
and he then said to me : “It is all right
giving promises, but for seven years 1
believed you were going to take action
and you have done nothing.”
As I have previously pointed out, there
would be rather serious consequences if
the Sultan of the Audali were defeated
and the Imam’s troops came down into
the whole of his estate because in that
case the Imam’s territory would extend
practically to the coast, and there would
be a corridor cutting Aden in two and
this corridor would be of a more grievous
kind than the one in Poland. What would
be the result of this 1 First of all, you
have in the Aden Protectorate levy a
.small but very efficient ahd hardy body
of 200 men. These are largely recruited
from the Audali country and also from
the States further east. With this corridor
which I have just described you might
lose them, which would mean you would
lose your best recruiting area for your
levy. A man would hardly join the Aden
Protectorate when he is a subject of the
Imam. It would obviously not be very
convenient for the tribes further to the
east to have to cross the Yemen terri
tory in order to get to the headquaiteis
of the Protectorate levy.
There is another point in connection
with this corridor. The corridor would
cut off all the tribes to the east, and also
the whole of the Hadramaut. That is
the coast line fronting the Indian Ocean
for which we are responsible. All com
munication by land would be at an end
between Aden and all these territories
lying to the east. That would not be very
exalting to our prestige, and the probable
result would be that other tribes nearer
to Aden would also desert the Protec
torate and put themselves under the
power or under the protection of the
Imam of the Yemen as the one strong
ma-Ti there. That will be almost the cer-