File 3516/1914 Pt 8 'German War: Persia' [‎156v] (317/434)

provided that the Kussian Legation agreed to arrange a personal matter, an und
taking which was at once given, while Farman. Farma whom I saw myself if ^
enthusiastic, seemed to fie chiefly concerned as to the capacity in which he should ^
his services. Indeed’, so general was the acquiescence that by the evening a Saad^I
Dowleh Cabinet seemed already to exist on paper.
Accordingly, next day I raised no objections to our adopting Saad-ed- Dow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. ] V
whose personal capacity for vigorous action cannot be doubted. He himself was alw^’
full of confidence, though he did not minimise the difficulties to be faced. He said t/!
the stoppage of silver payments by the Imperial Bank of Persia must be expected to
cause intense excitement, and pointed out that the only force that could be relied °
was the police. Our own enquiries showed that this is probably correct* the
gendarmerie is of very doubtful loyalty, being commanded by Swedish officers ol
avowed German sympathies ; and is for that very reason on bad terms with the
Cossack brigade, while the brigade, reduced to some 400 men in Tehran, is unpoDuia
and is asserted to be of little military value unless supported by Russian troops and
Saad-ed-Dowleh told us plainly that unless he could count oa the Kasvin garrison the
situation would be difficult to control. It was probable that they need Hever enter
Tehran ; - the news that they had started would have the necessary effect, but it was
essential that we should be in a position to call them up if necessary. Ain-ed-Dowleh
also hinted at impending trouble, and Colonel Merrill represented the situation as far
more dangerous than did Saad-ed-Dowleh. It is always difficult to tell what will
produce a sense of panic in a Persian town, but it is certain that at this moment and
for some days Tehran was the prey of the most fantastic terrors. The Armenians
were arming to massacre the Moslems, the Turks were already in Kermanshah and
ready to advance on the capital, Russia was building forts at Enzeli and 30,000 Russian
troops were on their way to Tehran, the Cossack brigade was going to attack the
gendarmerie, &c., and so real was the alarm that on Thursday night Colonel
Prozukwitch telephoned to M. de Bach saying that he heard the Russian Legation was
to be attacked and inviting him to spend the night at the quarters of the brigade,
while the same night some half-a-dozen German subjects knocked the American Minister
up at a late hour and remained in his house till morning. With the nerves of Tehran
m yp s condition it was clear that any excitement, such as the announcement of the
position of the Imperial Bank of Persia, might have resulted in serious disorders and
that it behoved us to take every measure to ensure the maintenance of tranquillity, and
we therefore telegraphed to our respective Governments urging that in case of need the
ussian troops at Kasvin might be authorised to move to Tehran, and that reinforce
ments might be held in readiness.
. The following morning Moin-el-Vizareh called on me and I told him that, as for
’\aiious reasons we had come to the conclusion that'Saad-ed-Dowleh was the most fitted
+1 1 c< f ) P e w lfl 1 the situation, M. de Bach and I intended to recommend him to
ie , a 1 as l^ 16 new Premier. Moin-el-Vizareh said that Saad’s unpopularity made
sa Y <in ail ^ n goment impossible, and declared that we could never carry it out, and as
an mur an a half later I received a telephone message from him at Farahabad to say
at . ie . ^ ia o desired to receive us the following day instead of at four o’clock as
pre\ lous y airanged, it is safe to conclude that he had gone to the palace to work
a^ains aa -e -Dowleh s appointment. I declined to be put off as the bank’s positi 0D
a( mi ec o no c clay whatever, and we were received by the Shah at the appointed
loin. ex P amec to His Majesty the nature of the circumstances that had induced us
to seex the audience with him, and the reasons why we had preferred the conduct of
a cdis m ie^ an s of Saad-ed-Dowleh rather than of Ain-ed-Dowleh or anyone else,
♦p e e e rmining reason being that he enjoyed the particular confidence of Russia, and
cn-nr^ -Tr 16 lcI P a j, lcns wer ? unhappily realised., it would be easier to get materia
T tU ® 8ia f° r a Gabinet under Saad than in any other circumstances. His
i 'L S *q’ P Y la Y C eai . T 06611 primed by Moin-el-Vizareh and other enemies of baa
’ a* ^^P 61 * 801 ^ 1 unpopularity, and suggested a Cabinet under Ala-es*
th-d wp 1 K ° f r • A Y' e , d " D ° W eh ’ and [t was onl y ^ter two and a half hours conversation
t: ° bta f 11J Y d h j? a r ent t0 Saad’s nomination. On our return to Tehran we ealW
us fnr^-C^ 0 k aai s rouse on Ain-ed-Dowleh, where a disagreeable surprise awai e
CaWt Th 11 ' r“ ln e 0Ur success his Highness firmly declined to join Saad
became evirU ^ it f 1 *’ 10Wever > . wa ® serenely confident, but on the following day
far Germsn R 4 t was wor ^^ n S to exclude Saad from office.
sentatives h ^ , Turk f h influence w«ca exerted, I cannot say, but the two ie P,
the Shah been t0 fe ’ ahabad la te in the night and had been received , J