Coll 6/81 'Syria: Status of Alexandretta and Antioch.' [‎73r] (146/576)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY -QT-HI S BRIT ANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Syria).
CONFIDENTIAL
136!
193?
February 8, 1937.
Section 1.
[E 848/3/89 ] Copy No.
Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—{Received February 8.)
(No. 12.)
Sir, Jedda, January 19, 1937.
IN my telegra m No. 3 , dated the 19th January, I reported the request of His
Majesty King AbduTAziz for the advice of His Majesty’s Government about the
question of Alexandretta and my discouraging personal reply. I now have the
honour to report more fully the conversation which I had with Fuad Bey on the
subject.
2. Fuad Bey said that the King had received a large number of telegrams
and other messages from all parts of the Arab world, urging him to take some
action to defend the rights of the Arabs in regard to Alexandretta, which were
threatened by the Turks. The King had maintained friendly relations with
Turkey, and was not anxious that they should be disturbed, but still. . . . Here
I asked why His Majesty should feel that he had to do something. Fuad Bey
said that His Majesty must naturally feel strongly about a matter affecting the
Arab world so closely. He did not want to do anything, however, without the
approval of His Majesty’s Government. How would it he if he appealed to the
Turks ?
3. I said that so far as my knowledge went His Majesty’s Government
considered that Alexandretta (I followed Fuad Bey in saying “ Alexandretta,”
though he no doubt meant Antioch as well) ought to remain within the Syrian
group of territories, and that their efforts were being bent to that end, and I
quoted what is common knowledge about the progress of the Franco-Turkish
negotiations. As this did not appear to console Fuad Bey, I asked what reason
there was to think that an appeal to the Turks would operate in the desired
direction. The Turks would ask what standing Saudi Arabia had in the matter,
and it might tend to make them more instead of less difficult. It might recall the
Arab revolt and arouse hostility instead of sympathy. It was, of course, for His
Majesty to decide whether to approach the Turks or not, but I personally doubted
the utility of such a step.
4. Fuad Bey went on to refer to that suspicion of Turkey of which Ibn Saud
has given evidence from time to time. His Majesty had always believed, he said,
that Turkey had never really abandoned her claim to Mosul and its oil, that she
was only awaiting a chance to revive that claim, and that if she had her way
with Alexandretta it would be an encouragement to her in the matter of Iraq.
The Arabs regarded the Turks and the Persians as their hereditary enemies. He
himself had spoken of King Abdul Aziz’s fears of Turkey, when he was at the
Foreign Office several years ago, and had received a reply intended to calm those
fears, but they still existed. To my statement that the Turks seemed to prefer a
homogeneous country and not to want to absorb non-Turkish populations,
Fuad Bey asked why then they coveted Alexandretta. He had had discussions
with Turkish officials at Angora a few years ago, and had received assurances
that they felt no resentment for the past, and that modern Turkey coveted no Arab
land. The Turkish policy with regard to Alexandretta was in conflict with those
assurances. I pointed out, however, that the basis of the Turkish claim was that
in their opinion the majority of the population of Alexandretta was Turkish.
5. And now I felt that a warning ought to be uttered. I suggested that
Fuad Bey was creating a dangerous state of confusion by using the phrase “ Arab
world ” in two quite different senses. There was an Arab world in the sense that
there were communities Arab in language and Moslem in religion which might
have certain sympathies in common,"but he appeared to be using the phrase as
though it stood for a political entity which was called upon to take action when
ever the interests of any Arabs anywhere were affected. This, I said, seemed to me
a most dangerous doctrine and likely to cause serious trouble if acted upon. He
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