Coll 6/81 'Syria: Status of Alexandretta and Antioch.' [‎172v] (345/576)

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40. The Turks were disappointed with the outcome of the Paris talks, and
they became angry when the French Ambassador at Angora returned to his post
early in January without any fresh instructions, although M. Blum had
promised M. Aras in Paris to look into the matter personally. The tone of the
Turkish press became distinctly menacing, there were rumours of concentrations
of 1 urkish troops on the Syrian frontier, and excitement and anxiety were mui^
increased when the Turkish President suddenly left Angora for Southern Turkey
and broke his journey at Eskishehr for a secret conference with his principal civil
and military advisers. The French press took alarm, and persistent rumours
circulated that the Turks were contemplating a coup de main in the sanjak.
41. Meanwhile, the position in the sanjak continued to be highly delicate.
According to a report of the 16th December from His Majesty’s consul at Aleppo,
the Turkish propaganda seemed to have taken some effect in the territory.
Mr. Davis expressed the opinion that, while only a small part of the Turkish
elements fervently desired union with Turkey, they would all prefer it to
subordination to an Arab administration. The majority of the rest of the
population seemed to favour autonomy, but, for economic reasons, might well opt
for inclusion in 1 urkey rather than Syria. The three neutral observers (of
Norwegian, Dutch and Swiss nationality), who had been appointed in accordance
with the decision of the League Council on the 16th December (paragraph 31
above), arrived in the sanjak early in January. Their presence in the town of
Alexandretta was the signal for a demonstration by Turkish elements, followed
by a counter-demonstration by the Arab nationalists, which obliged the authorities
to close the town to the outside world.
42. Meanwhile, occasion has been taken recently to make the attitude of
His Majesty’s Government towards the dispute entirely clear to the Turkish
Government, who, it seems, may not have been informed of the warning which
M. Aras received from Lord Cranborne on the 14th December (paragraph 20
above), since on the 27th December His Majesty’s Ambassador at Angora reported
that they were apparently looking forward to British support for their thesis
at the coming session of the Council. The Turkish Ambassador called on
Sir R. Vansittart on the 1st January, and was given a detailed explanation of
the views of His Majesty’s Government on the legal aspect of the question (on
the lines of paragraphs 15-16 above), which compelled them to oppose the present
Turkish demands. On the 7th January M. Fethi Okyar called on the Secretary
of State and embarked on a further attempt to justify the Turkish case, chiefly
on the basis that it was impossible for Turks to be subjected politically to Arabs.
He said that he had been instructed to ask for Mr. Eden’s support.
43. The Secretary of State told the Ambassador in reply that he could only
endorse the account of the attitude of His Majesty's Government which had been
given to M. Aras at Geneva by Lord Cranborne and to M. Okyar himself at the
Foreign Office on the 1st January. Turning to the immediate situation,
Mr. Eden drew the Ambassador’s attention to the unfortunate rumours that were
circulating in the press about I urkish troop concentrations on the Syrian frontier,
and expressed the hope that they had not, in fact, taken place, since they could
only fail to aggravate the situation with which the League would soon have to
deal. Anglo-Turkish relations were exceptionally good and His Majesty’s
Government felt that they could give the Turkish Government the frank advice
to go slow and to be very careful not to take any action which might be misunder
stood. or might aggravate the situation. This advice was entirely spontaneous;
no communication had been received recently from the French Government. In
response to a subsequent enquiry by the Ambassador, Mr. Eden said that the
Turkish Government could he sure that His Majesty’s Government would do
anything in their power to further a solution; they were very good friends with
both Turkey and France, and—to put it no higher—it was in their interest
to do so.
44. At the time of writing (the 11th January), the latest developments in
the situation are more reassuring. Sir P. Loraine had a long and apparently
satisfactory conversation with M. Aras on the 7th January, in which the latter
admitted for the first time that the formal independence of the sanjak was not
necessarily a sine qua non for Turkey. M. Aras also denied that any increase
had taken place in Turkish units covering the Syrian frontier, or that any
political significance attached to M. Ataturk’s journey. He added that Turkey
intended to conduct her case in a strictly legal manner. Meanwhile, M. Vffinot
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