Coll 5/10 ‘Air Route to India: Persia; Arabian Coast Route; Negotiations with Arab Sheikhs’ [‎193v] (397/800)

fi The India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. hope that it may be possible to secure the necessary
, a Guarantees from the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah, or from the
u rmm g al Oaiwain in return for a subsidy not exceeding £3,000 a year,
ol the urgency of the matter, they are most anxious that the Political
Resident ui the pfrsian Gulf should be authorised to open negotiations on this
basts when he visits this area in the very near future. They hope that the
basis, wnen ne subsidy could be arranged in such a way as not onlv^
toSe the acquiescence of the Sheikh concerned in the establishment of tk
andhig and refuelling station in his lagoon or creek, but also so as to secure his
co operation and that of his unruly subjects and potential rivals, m guaranteeing
tL safe y of the installation The India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. and Air Ministry can suggest
no other alternative, and are hopeful that this proposal will secure the necessary
minimum of safety to render possible the continued operation of the air route to
India' 11 The arrangements involved will take some months to complete and it is
therefore of the utmost importance that a settlement should be reached More
the end of the present year. Before, however, any negotiations even of a
preliminary character can be opened with the rulers concerned, it is necessary to
obtain Treasury sanction for the proposed subsidy.
7 The Admiralty, while not disputing the desirability of ensuring the
continuance of the air route to India, regard the proposal of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. and
Air Ministry as involving considerable risks and as liable to lead to commitments
on a larger scale than the other Departments anticipate. They would have much
preferred that the landing and refuelling station between Bahrein and Gwadar
should either be eliminated or be situated on one of the islands m the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
or at a point under more direct British control than eithei lias al-Rhaiman or
Umm-al-Qaiwain. They would therefore urge that a further investigation
should be made of the possible alternatives; but if, as the Air Ministry contend
those alternatives should still prove entirely impracticable, they are anxious that
the decision to open negotiations with the Sheikhs of Ras-al-Khaimah and
Umm-al-Qaiwain should not be taken without a full realisation of the possible
commitments and dangers involved.
8. In this connection the Admiralty point out that, when concluding the
present agreement for the mooring of the R.A.F. barge, the sheikh oi
Ras-al-Khaimah was given to understand by our Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. Agent (an Arab), m
response to his specific enquiry, that no further concession would be demandea
of him. It is possible, therefore, that a request now for further facilities mignt
be misrepresented as a breach of faith which might prejudice our position wi
the Trucial Arabs generally, though this danger may be considered to have been
reduced by the recent tacit acceptance by the Sheikh of the use by the K A i - ^
a shore landing ground. The Admiralty further consider that, even n e
proposed negotiations should lead to a successful result, the position in whic e
rest vessel and barges will be moored in the lagoon at Ras-al-Khaimah, wnicn is
land-locked, and out of sight from warships anchored off the town, will expo
the rest vessel and barges to risk of sniping at night by disaffected followers o
the local Sheikh or by members of neighbouring tribes seeking an opportuni}
embroil the Sheikh. In addition, the Sheikh will be exposed to the risk ot a
by neighbouring tribesmen on a serious scale, which might lead to our having ^
support him, and possibly to carry out punitive operations. In the even ,.
trouble occurring, the fact that at Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Qai wain wars p
cannot enter the Lagoon, but are forced to lie some one and a half miles s
ward, makes it impossible for the Navy to afford any defence without lan g
forces from the ship. The Admiralty also point out that a further complies
would be introduced in the event of an aircraft operated by a foreign comp^
becoming involved in any incident on the Trucial coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. , since the nece ,
measures to obtain reparations and to ensure future protection might deve op
a question of international concern.
9. The Air Ministry do not entirely share the Admiralty views,
opinion, based on considerable experience of tribal control in widely cj.
countries, the maintenance of the rest vessel and the necessary Imperial
installation on the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. can best be obtained by imposing respom
upon the Sheikh concerned; by supporting his authority if his attitude ls ger | oUS
factory An East India Company trading post. , and by rapid action against him if it is not. In the ev ? nt /^aircraft
incident occurring on the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. , the Air Ministry view is that