Coll 5/10 ‘Air Route to India: Persia; Arabian Coast Route; Negotiations with Arab Sheikhs’ [‎260v] (531/800)

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when granting the concession, oi her subsequent attitude, and of the fact
that she has never ratified the International Air Tiaffic Convention, averse
from approaching the Persians with a request of this nature, which
particularly in the absence of any lever on our side, would be certain to be
refused. ^
(b) Central Persian Route.
The route through Central Persia prescribed by the Persian Government
has been surveyed and reported on as commercially and operationally
impracticable, and there appears to be no other inland route possible.
(c) The Arabian Coast Route.
This appears feasible, if satisfactory arrangements can be come to with
the Sheikhs of Ras-al-Khaimah or Umm-al-Kaiwain, but to open it up may
entail, in the opinion of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , serious political drawbacks, whilst
it is longer, on the whole, more difficult of operation, less comfortable foi
passengers and definitely more costly.
9 . With these conflicting considerations and the divergent views held by
the Foreign Office and the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , it is very difficult for me to present to
my colleagues any clear-cut recommendation. 1 presume it can be premised that
somehow or other the continued operation of this route must be secured; to
abandon the Indian service—a service which is bound to grow steadily in
importance with the passage of time—is, in my view, unthinkable, and would
react on our prestige throughout the whole of the East. If this situation is to
be avoided, some action must be taken and taken immediately. The question is
what that action should be, and it is on this that I am anxious to take counsel
with my colleagues as a matter of urgency. My own tentative recommendations
are as under :—
( 1 ) If it is not possible to take further diplomatic action with Persia at the
present juncture through official channels for an extension of the
present permit on a firm basis, then arrangements should be made for
Imperial Airways to approach the Persian Government forthwith
as a matter of ordinary commercial negotiation. It seems incumbent
upon us to notify the Persian Government that a careful survey has
now shown the Central Persian route to be impracticable, and. in
doing so, it would appear natural and inevitable to ask for a
continuance of facilities to use the coastal route. I may say that I
have taken steps to secure informally the advice of Sir John Cadman
on the advisability of such negotiations, in view of his intimate
knowledge of present conditions in Persia. He definitely recommends
such action, and has intimated that the Anglo-Persian Company will
give all possible assistance to Imperial Airways, though it cannot
actually negotiate on their behalf. I would emphasise, however, that,
in the light of the advice tendered by the Foreign Office, I am none
too hopeful of the result of these unofficial negotiations, which are
likely in any event to drag on for several months.
( 2 ) Whatever action may be taken under ( 1 ) I consider that we ought forth
with to take all preliminary action for the organisation of the
Arabian coast route—a course advocated by our Minister at Tehran
and the Foreign Office since July 1930—despite its admitted draw
backs from the political and other aspects. It will take several months
to organise, and we simply cannot afford to wait on the results oi
further negotiations with the Persians, whether official or unqmcia^
I should add that the Foreign Office incline to the view that signs o
activity on our part on the Arabian side may just possibly produce a
more accommodating frame of mind in the Persian authorities.
(Initialled) ^
A ir Ministry, July 23, 1931.
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